LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1003.005: Cached Domain Credentials

Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.[1]

On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.[2] The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires Password Cracking to recover the plaintext password.[3]

On Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use Password Cracking to obtain the plaintext password.[4]

With SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as Mimikatz, Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.[4]

Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.[2]

EnterpriseT1003.005Sub-techniqueObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Cached Domain Credentials matter because they turn endpoint or server compromise into possible domain account exposure. Windows and Linux systems may keep domain credential material locally so users can authenticate when a domain controller is unavailable. If an adversary already has SYSTEM or sudo-level access, they may extract these cached hashes and attempt password cracking to recover plaintext passwords. This is a business-continuity tradeoff: cached logon supports operations during connectivity issues, but it also creates local credential residue that incident responders must treat as sensitive.

Executive priority

Security leaders should treat this as a control-validation issue for privileged access, endpoint hardening, and incident response scoping. The key question is not only whether domain credentials are cached, but which accounts can be cached, how many are retained, whether privileged accounts appear on workstations or Linux systems joined to Active Directory, and whether SOC teams can prove visibility into local credential-cache access. This technique is especially relevant to audit evidence around privileged account management, password policy, Active Directory configuration, and OS configuration.

Technical view

T1003.005 is a credential-access sub-technique of OS Credential Dumping for Windows and Linux. ATT&CK notes that Windows Vista and newer use DCC2/MS-Cache v2 hashes, which do not enable pass-the-hash directly and instead require Password Cracking to recover plaintext. On Linux, Active Directory credential caches may be maintained by SSSD or Quest Authentication Services. Validate monitoring for privileged access to local credential-cache stores, suspicious use of credential-dumping or administrative utilities referenced by ATT&CK, and follow-on password-cracking indicators where visible. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text here, use the related DET0513 detection strategy as a starting point rather than assuming coverage.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process execution telemetry for privileged tools and utilities associated with cached credential extraction, including administrative registry access on Windows and cache-database access on Linux
  • File and registry access telemetry for local credential-cache locations and related authentication-cache databases
  • Privilege elevation and privileged session logs showing SYSTEM, root, or sudo activity before cache access
  • Windows and Linux authentication logs to identify systems where domain users authenticate and may create cached credential material
  • EDR or host audit events for unusual reads, copies, or dumps of authentication cache files

Detection direction

  • Confirm whether DET0513 or equivalent logic is implemented for local hash-cache access rather than relying only on generic credential-dumping alerts.
  • Tune detections around privileged access to credential-cache stores, with allowlisting for legitimate administration and authentication-service maintenance to reduce false positives.
  • Correlate suspicious cache access with prior privilege escalation, unusual administrative tool use, or remote administration sessions.
  • Validate coverage on both Windows and Linux systems joined to Active Directory; Linux SSSD and Quest cache locations are common blind spots in Windows-centric SOC programs.
  • Do not treat absence of pass-the-hash behavior as absence of risk; ATT&CK states these hashes require password cracking for plaintext recovery.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize Privileged Account Management: reduce where privileged domain accounts log on, enforce least privilege, and monitor privileged account usage.
  • Review Active Directory and OS configuration: determine how many cached domain credentials are retained per system and reduce retention where operationally acceptable.
  • Strengthen password policies so recovered cached hashes are harder to crack, consistent with the related Password Policies mitigation.
  • Harden Windows and Linux endpoints that store domain credential material, including systems using SSSD or Quest Authentication Services.
  • Use user training as a supporting control for reducing credential compromise paths, but do not treat it as the primary mitigation for local cached credential extraction.
Additional notes and limits

ATT&CK links this technique to multiple groups and software entries, including OilRig, APT33, MuddyWater, Leafminer, Cachedump, Pupy, LaZagne, and Okrum. Those relationships show the behavior has appeared in ATT&CK reporting, but they do not by themselves prove current activity in any specific environment. The most useful local validation is an inventory of systems that cache domain credentials, privileged accounts that have logged on to them, and host telemetry that records cache access.

The official ATT&CK object does not provide detection guidance, so detection recommendations are inferred from the technique description and the related DET0513 detection strategy relationship. Local operating system configuration, logging depth, EDR capability, and authentication architecture are required to determine actual exposure and coverage. No active exploitation, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection is implied.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Cached Domain Credentials

Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.[1]

On Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash.[2] The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires Password Cracking to recover the plaintext password.[3]

On Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use Password Cracking to obtain the plaintext password.[4]

With SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as Mimikatz, Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.[4]

Note: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1003OS Credential DumpingThis object subtechnique of OS Credential Dumping.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0064: APT33

APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0077: Leafminer

Leafminer is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0049: OilRig

OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

GroupEnterprise

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

ToolEnterprise

S0349: LaZagne

LaZagne is a post-exploitation, open-source tool used to recover stored passwords on a system. It has modules for Windows, Linux, and OSX, but is mainly focused on Windows systems. LaZagne is publicly available on GitHub.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
ToolEnterprise

S0192: Pupy

Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. [1] It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). [1] Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. [1]

LinuxWindowsmacOS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f9bf40c99ecc0e19...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundlef9bf40c99ecc…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft - Cached Creds

    Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    PassLib mscache

    Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    ired mscache

    Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    ESET Okrum July 2019

    Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Symantec Elfin Mar 2019

    Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    FireEye APT33 Guardrail

    Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Symantec Leafminer July 2018

    Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Mandiant APT1

    Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Microsoft Protected Users Security Group

    Microsoft. (2016, October 12). Protected Users Security Group. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    GitHub LaZagne Dec 2018

    Zanni, A. (n.d.). The LaZagne Project !!!. Retrieved December 14, 2018.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Tilbury Windows Credentials

    Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023

    Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017

    Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    FireEye APT35 2018

    Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    FireEye APT34 July 2019

    Bromiley, M., et al.. (2019, July 18). Hard Pass: Declining APT34’s Invite to Join Their Professional Network. Retrieved August 26, 2019.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    GitHub Pupy

    Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017

    Lancaster, T.. (2017, November 14). Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East. Retrieved March 15, 2018.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018

    Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2018, December 10). Seedworm: Group Compromises Government Agencies, Oil & Gas, NGOs, Telecoms, and IT Firms. Retrieved December 14, 2018.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Microsoft - Cached Creds

    Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Microsoft - Cached Creds

    Microsoft. (2016, August 21). Cached and Stored Credentials Technical Overview. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    PassLib mscache

    Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    PassLib mscache

    Eli Collins. (2016, November 25). Windows' Domain Cached Credentials v2. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Powersploit

    PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    Powersploit

    PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    Powersploit

    PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    ired mscache

    Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    ired mscache

    Mantvydas Baranauskas. (2019, November 16). Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    mitre-attackT1003.005
    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    mitre-attackT1003.005
    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    mitre-attackT1003.005
    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET Okrum July 2019

    Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    FireEye APT33 Guardrail

    Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Symantec Elfin Mar 2019

    Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    Symantec Leafminer July 2018

    Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    Mandiant APT1

    Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    Microsoft Protected Users Security Group

    Microsoft. (2016, October 12). Protected Users Security Group. Retrieved May 29, 2020.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    GitHub LaZagne Dec 2018

    Zanni, A. (n.d.). The LaZagne Project !!!. Retrieved December 14, 2018.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Tilbury Windows Credentials

    Chad Tilbury. (2017, August 8). 1Windows Credentials: Attack, Mitigation, Defense. Retrieved February 21, 2020.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    FireEye APT34 July 2019

    Bromiley, M., et al.. (2019, July 18). Hard Pass: Declining APT34’s Invite to Join Their Professional Network. Retrieved August 26, 2019.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017

    Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    FireEye APT35 2018

    Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023

    Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    GitHub Pupy

    Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.