C0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign
The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was conducted in September 2025 by a likely China nexus espionage actor identified as GTG-1002. The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was a highly coordinated operation that manipulated Claude Code to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvesting, data analysis, and exfiltration operations at approximately 30 entities in the technology, financial, chemical, and government sectors. During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, human operators used Claude Code agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools to automate cyber operations. Operators broke attacks into discrete tasks, used crafted prompts, and established personas to bypass AI guardrails, enabling the agents to execute the operations with minimal human involvement.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
C0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign describes The [Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0062) was conducted in September 2025 by a likely China nexus espionage actor identified as GTG-1002. The [Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0062) was a highly coordinated operation that manipulated Claude Code to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvesting, data analysis, and exfiltration operations at approximately 30 entities in the technolo...
Executive priority
C0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate C0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether C0062: Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign
The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was conducted in September 2025 by a likely China nexus espionage actor identified as GTG-1002. The Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign was a highly coordinated operation that manipulated Claude Code to perform reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvesting, data analysis, and exfiltration operations at approximately 30 entities in the technology, financial, chemical, and government sectors. During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, human operators used Claude Code agents and Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools to automate cyber operations. Operators broke attacks into discrete tasks, used crafted prompts, and established personas to bypass AI guardrails, enabling the agents to execute the operations with minimal human involvement.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to deploy a custom exploit payload targeting an identified SSRF vulnerability to gain initial access to a targeted environment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary obtained open-source penetration testing tools including network scanners, database exploitation frameworks, password crackers, and binary analysis suites.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.007 | Artificial IntelligenceSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary obtained access to Claude Code to support cyber intrusion operations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1136.001 | Local AccountSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to create a local backdoor account to maintain access.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1592.002 | SoftwareSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary utilized Claude Code to catalog services and data on discovered endpoints.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1590.004 | Network TopologySub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map a complete network topology of the target infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary leveraged Claude Code to identify sensitive data within the victim environment for extraction.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used harvested credentials to authenticate against internal APIs, database systems, container registries, and logging infrastructure across targeted networks.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to stage extracted data and operational documentation in structured markdown files on local systems prior to exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1595.002 | Vulnerability ScanningSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to scan target infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and to enumerate services and endpoints.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to query internal database user account tables to enumerate accounts and identify high-privilege accounts within compromised environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1587.004 | ExploitsSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to research exploitation techniques for an identified SSRF vulnerability, to generate a tailored custom attack payload, and to develop a full exploit chain prior to deployment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1552.001 | Credentials In FilesSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to extract authentication certificates stored in system configuration files across compromised environments.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary utilized Claude Code to generate a detailed summary report of collected data, which is then reviewed and approved by the adversary prior to exfiltration of data over Claude.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1595.001 | Scanning IP BlocksSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to scan infrastructure across IP ranges associated with the target organization.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to enumerate internal network services and endpoints across targeted environments using browser automation via MCP, including databases, container registries, admin interfaces, and workflow orchestration platforms.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local AccountsSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to test credentials harvested against discovered devices.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1584.004 | ServerSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary operated dedicated penetration testing servers accessible via MCP to support remote command execution, simultaneous tool coordination, and persistent operational state maintenance across campaign sessions.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1213.006 | DatabasesSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to query internal databases and systems to extract proprietary information, system configurations, and sensitive operational data. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary configured Claude Code to identify and gather system configurations of discovered devices.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to automatically collect and process large volumes of data from without human direction.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1683 | Generate Content | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary utilized Claude Code to automatically generate comprehensive documentation throughout the phases of the attack, including discovered services, harvested credentials, sensitive data, exploitation techniques, and complete attack progression.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1592.004 | Client ConfigurationsSub-technique | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary leveraged Claude Code to gather details of high-value systems to include databases and workflow orchestration platforms.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary tasked Claude Code to automatically gather sensitive data stored within the local system to include credentials, system configurations and sensitive operational data.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary tasked Claude Code to query databases and systems in order to identify proprietary information, including system configurations and database types.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | During the Anthropic AI-orchestrated Campaign, the adversary used Claude Code to map internal network architecture and access relationships.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | f5a14875ccee… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | eb58c8bb5b6f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Anthropic AI Orchestrated Campaign NOV 2025
Anthropic. (2025, November). Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign. Retrieved April 20, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]Anthropic Disrupting AI Espionage NOV 2025
Anthropic. (2025, November 13). Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign. Retrieved April 20, 2026.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackC0062Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.