T1003.008: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information, including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.CitationLinux Password and Shadow File Formats
Linux stores user information such as user ID, group ID, home directory path, and login shell in /etc/passwd. A "user" on the system may belong to a person or a service. All password hashes are stored in /etc/shadow - including entries for users with no passwords and users with locked or disabled accounts.CitationLinux Password and Shadow File Formats
Adversaries may attempt to read or dump the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems via command line utilities such as the cat command.CitationArctic Wolf Additionally, the Linux utility unshadow can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper - for example, via the command /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.dbCitationnixCraft - John the Ripper. Since the user information stored in /etc/passwd are linked to the password hashes in /etc/shadow, an adversary would need to have access to both.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1003.008: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow describes Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information, including password hashes in /etc/shadow . By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.(Citation: Linux Password and Shadow File Formats) Linux stores user information such as user ID, group ID, home directory path, and login shell in /etc/passwd . A "user" on the system m...
Executive priority
T1003.008: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1003.008: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access), supported platforms (Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1003.008: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow to store user account information, including password hashes in /etc/shadow. By default, /etc/shadow is only readable by the root user.CitationLinux Password and Shadow File Formats
Linux stores user information such as user ID, group ID, home directory path, and login shell in /etc/passwd. A "user" on the system may belong to a person or a service. All password hashes are stored in /etc/shadow - including entries for users with no passwords and users with locked or disabled accounts.CitationLinux Password and Shadow File Formats
Adversaries may attempt to read or dump the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files on Linux systems via command line utilities such as the cat command.CitationArctic Wolf Additionally, the Linux utility unshadow can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper - for example, via the command /usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.dbCitationnixCraft - John the Ripper. Since the user information stored in /etc/passwd are linked to the password hashes in /etc/shadow, an adversary would need to have access to both.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.