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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0148: RTM

RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). Newer versions of the malware have been reported publicly as Redaman.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0148MalwareObject v1.2 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

RTM is a Windows malware family written in Delphi and associated in ATT&CK with the RTM cybercriminal group. Its mapped behaviors matter because they combine credential and user-data collection, host discovery, persistence, command-and-control, and cleanup/stealth techniques. For leaders, the practical issue is not only whether a signature exists, but whether the organization can see and investigate Windows activity that looks like banking-trojan-style credential theft and persistence.

Executive priority

Prioritize RTM as a validation case for Windows endpoint resilience, identity risk, and incident response readiness. The ATT&CK relationships show behaviors that can affect credential exposure, fraud risk, and investigation quality: keylogging, screen and clipboard collection, scheduled task persistence, registry modification, web-based C2, ingress tool transfer, obfuscation, masquerading, and file/persistence cleanup. Executives should ask whether SOC coverage is behavior-based, whether evidence survives cleanup attempts, and whether high-risk financial or remote-banking users receive stronger monitoring and access controls.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide an official detection section for RTM, so coverage should be validated against the mapped techniques rather than a single malware name. On Windows, focus on suspicious scheduled task creation or modification, registry changes linked to persistence or defense evasion, command shell execution, user/system/process/file discovery, and collection behaviors such as keylogging, screen capture, clipboard access, and automated collection. Network teams should validate visibility into outbound web-protocol C2 patterns and use of legitimate web services as dead-drop resolvers. IR teams should also plan for obfuscated/compressed payloads, masqueraded task or service names, file deletion, and clearing of persistence artifacts.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line events, especially cmd.exe and discovery command patterns
  • Windows Task Scheduler events and task XML/name/description changes
  • Windows Registry modification telemetry for persistence- and defense-evasion-relevant keys
  • File creation, deletion, compression/archive, and executable metadata telemetry on endpoints
  • Endpoint alerts or behavioral telemetry for keyboard, screen capture, clipboard, and automated collection activity

Detection direction

  • Because MITRE provides no official RTM detection text, build detections around technique clusters: persistence plus masquerading, discovery plus collection, and web C2 plus tool transfer.
  • Tune scheduled-task detections for suspicious task names, descriptions, paths, or timing, while accounting for legitimate administrative and software-update tasks.
  • Correlate registry modification, task creation, and command shell execution from the same host or user context to reduce false positives.
  • Look for discovery activity followed by credential or collection behavior, including keylogging, screen capture, clipboard access, or automated file collection.
  • Review network detections for outbound HTTP/S patterns that blend into normal traffic, including contacts to legitimate external services that may act as dead-drop resolvers.

Mitigation priorities

  • Confirm Windows endpoint logging and EDR coverage for task scheduling, registry modification, process creation, file deletion, and suspicious collection behavior.
  • Harden persistence surfaces by limiting who can create scheduled tasks or modify sensitive registry locations, and review administrative access regularly.
  • Reduce credential-theft impact with strong identity controls for high-risk users, especially users of remote banking or financial systems.
  • Apply egress monitoring and filtering appropriate to business requirements, with attention to unusual HTTP/S destinations and web-service-based resolver behavior.
  • Prepare IR playbooks to preserve volatile endpoint evidence quickly, because the mapped techniques include file deletion and clearing persistence artifacts.
Analyst notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies RTM as custom Delphi malware, newer versions publicly reported as Redaman, and links it to the RTM group. Relationship context maps RTM to multiple ATT&CK techniques across stealth, discovery, execution, persistence, credential access, collection, and command-and-control behaviors. The group description states interest in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries; this should inform threat-intelligence context without being treated as proof of local exposure.

No official MITRE detection guidance is provided for this object, and the object itself lists Windows as the platform with no object-level tactics specified. Technique relationship descriptions include broader platform coverage, but this take treats RTM coverage as Windows-focused unless local intelligence supports otherwise. Local telemetry, asset criticality, user population, and incident evidence are required to determine actual risk or detection coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

RTM

RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). Newer versions of the malware have been reported publicly as Redaman.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

38 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Sub-technique

RTM can attempt to run the program as admin, then show a fake error message and a legitimate UAC bypass prompt to the user in an attempt to socially engineer the user into escalating privileges.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1219 Remote Access Tools

RTM has the capability to download a VNC module from command and control (C2).CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

RTM uses the command line and rundll32.exe to execute.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1115 Clipboard Data

RTM collects data from the clipboard.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1056.001 Keylogging Sub-technique

RTM can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1568 Dynamic Resolution

RTM has resolved Pony C2 server IP addresses by either converting Bitcoin blockchain transaction data to specific octets, or accessing IP addresses directly within the Namecoin blockchain.CitationCheckPoint Redaman October 2019CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

RTM has been delivered via spearphishing attachments disguised as PDF documents.CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1027.015 Compression Sub-technique

RTM has been delivered to targets as various archive files including ZIP, 7-ZIP, and RAR.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery

RTM can obtain a list of smart card readers attached to the victim.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1124 System Time Discovery

RTM can obtain the victim time zone.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Sub-technique

RTM can search for specific strings within browser tabs using a Dynamic Data Exchange mechanism.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1553.002 Code Signing Sub-technique

RTM samples have been signed with a code-signing certificates.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

RTM can detect if it is running within a sandbox or other virtualized analysis environment.CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sub-technique

RTM tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service Sub-technique

RTM has named the scheduled task it creates "Windows Update".CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography Sub-technique

RTM encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1112 Modify Registry

RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver Sub-technique

RTM has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names. RTM has also hidden Pony C2 server IP addresses within transactions on the Bitcoin and Namecoin blockchain.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationCheckPoint Redaman October 2019CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1106 Native API

RTM can use the FindNextUrlCacheEntryA and FindFirstUrlCacheEntryA functions to search for specific strings within browser history.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

RTM monitors browsing activity and automatically captures screenshots if a victim browses to a URL matching one of a list of strings.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

RTM can obtain the victim username and permissions.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1553.004 Install Root Certificate Sub-technique

RTM can add a certificate to the Windows store.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

RTM has initiated connections to external domains using HTTPS.CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1218.011 Rundll32 Sub-technique

RTM runs its core DLL file using rundll32.exe.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1571 Non-Standard Port

RTM used Port 44443 for its VNC module.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

RTM can obtain the computer name, OS version, and default language identifier.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

RTM can download additional files.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

RTM can check for specific files and directories associated with virtualization and malware analysis.CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

RTM strings, network data, configuration, and modules are encrypted with a modified RC4 algorithm.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Sub-technique

RTM can obtain information about security software on the victim.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File Sub-technique

RTM has relied on users opening malicious email attachments, decompressing the attached archive, and double-clicking the executable within.CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

RTM can obtain information about process integrity levels.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1518 Software Discovery

RTM can scan victim drives to look for specific banking software on the machine to determine next actions.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1113 Screen Capture

RTM can capture screenshots.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1070.009 Clear Persistence Sub-technique

RTM has the ability to remove Registry entries that it created for persistence.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017
Enterprise T1036 Masquerading

RTM has been delivered as archived Windows executable files masquerading as PDF documents.CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion Sub-technique

RTM can delete all files created during its execution.CitationESET RTM Feb 2017CitationUnit42 Redaman January 2019
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0048: RTM

RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM). [1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1548.002: Bypass User Account Control Enterprise uses · Technique T1219: Remote Access Tools Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.003: Windows Command Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1115: Clipboard Data Enterprise uses · Technique T1056.001: Keylogging Enterprise uses · Technique T1568: Dynamic Resolution Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.015: Compression Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise uses · Technique T1120: Peripheral Device Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1124: System Time Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1559.002: Dynamic Data Exchange Enterprise uses · Technique T1553.002: Code Signing Enterprise uses · Technique T1497: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Enterprise uses · Technique T1053.005: Scheduled Task Enterprise uses · Technique T1036.004: Masquerade Task or Service Enterprise uses · Technique T1573.001: Symmetric Cryptography Enterprise uses · Technique T1112: Modify Registry Enterprise uses · Technique T1102.001: Dead Drop Resolver Enterprise uses · Group G0048: RTM Enterprise uses · Technique T1106: Native API Enterprise uses · Technique T1119: Automated Collection Enterprise uses · Technique T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1553.004: Install Root Certificate Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
cfbd4a3aa6386118...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.2 Current bundle cfbd4a3aa638…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET RTM Feb 2017

    Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit42 Redaman January 2019

    Duncan, B., Harbison, M. (2019, January 23). Russian Language Malspam Pushing Redaman Banking Malware. Retrieved June 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Redaman

    (Citation: Unit42 Redaman January 2019)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attack S0148
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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