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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0081: Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0081GroupObject v1.6 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Tropic Trooper is a long-running threat group in ATT&CK associated with targeted campaigns against government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech organizations in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. For leaders, the practical issue is not the name of the group but the defensive pattern: ATT&CK links this group to remote access tools, backdoors, discovery activity, command-and-control over web and DNS protocols, automated exfiltration, and USB-based exfiltration relevant to air-gapped environments.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a resilience and assurance use case where the organization operates in, supports, or resembles the sectors and regions described by ATT&CK, or where sensitive environments depend on segmentation or air gaps. Executives should ask whether security teams can prove visibility across Windows endpoints, command-line activity, removable media, DNS/web egress, local account use, and data movement. This object also supports audit and risk discussions around air-gapped operations, third-party/supply-chain exposure, and whether incident responders can investigate both connected and disconnected systems.

Technical view

ATT&CK does not provide a detection section for Tropic Trooper itself, so coverage should be validated through the linked software and techniques. Relationship context points to Windows-focused malware/tools including PoisonIvy, BITSAdmin, KeyBoy, YAHOYAH, USBferry, and ShadowPad, plus behaviors such as discovery, Windows command shell execution, DLL injection, masquerading, file deletion, local account abuse, web/DNS command-and-control, automated exfiltration, and exfiltration over USB. SOC and IR teams should map detections to these behaviors rather than relying on group-name alerts.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, especially cmd.exe and administrative utilities
  • Windows DLL load, process injection, and suspicious process access events where available
  • File creation, modification, deletion, and unusual executable placement or naming patterns
  • DNS query logs and web proxy/firewall egress logs for command-and-control analysis
  • BITS job creation and usage telemetry on Windows systems

Detection direction

  • Build behavior-based detections around the related ATT&CK techniques rather than expecting a single Tropic Trooper signature.
  • Validate visibility for discovery commands and enumeration of users, processes, files, network configuration, network connections, and services.
  • Tune web and DNS command-and-control analytics to reduce false positives from normal business traffic while retaining visibility into rare domains, unusual query patterns, and abnormal egress from sensitive hosts.
  • Review removable media monitoring for environments that rely on air gaps; USB-based exfiltration is specifically represented through the USBferry and Exfiltration over USB relationships.
  • Correlate local account use with unusual execution, discovery, or data movement because local accounts are listed as an abused access mechanism in the related techniques.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with asset and data prioritization for government, healthcare, transportation, high-tech, military, or air-gapped environments when relevant to the organization.
  • Harden and monitor local accounts, especially administrative and shared local credentials; reduce reuse and ensure investigation-ready authentication logs.
  • Restrict and monitor removable media use in sensitive and segmented environments, with documented exceptions and evidence collection procedures.
  • Ensure endpoint controls capture command execution, suspicious DLL activity, file deletion, and unexpected tool use such as BITSAdmin.
  • Control egress through DNS and web gateways, and retain logs long enough to support incident response and threat hunting.
Analyst notes and limits

The group object has no official ATT&CK detection text, no tactics listed on the group object itself, and no group-level platforms specified. The technical guidance is therefore derived from the supplied relationships to software and techniques. The related software is Windows-focused, but several related techniques list additional platforms; local validation should determine which apply in the environment.

This take does not assert current activity, attribution beyond the ATT&CK group description, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection coverage. External references are cited by ATT&CK, but their detailed contents were not used beyond the supplied fields. Organizations need their own telemetry, asset criticality, geography, sector exposure, and incident history to determine priority.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

40 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1543.003 Windows Service Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has installed a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.CitationPWC KeyBoys Feb 2017
Enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has deleted dropper files on an infected system using command scripts.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office and fake installer file attachments.CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015CitationCitizenLab Tropic Trooper Aug 2018CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Tropic Trooper has used a delivered trojan to download additional files.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

Tropic Trooper is capable of enumerating the running processes on the system using pslist.CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has lured victims into executing malware via malicious e-mail attachments.CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020
Enterprise T1573 Encrypted Channel

Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has used HTTP in communication with the C2.CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has created a hidden directory under C:\ProgramData\Apple\Updates\ and C:\Users\Public\Documents\Flash\.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1221 Template Injection

Tropic Trooper delivered malicious documents with the XLSX extension, typically used by OpenXML documents, but the file itself was actually an OLE (XLS) document.CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

Tropic Trooper used letmein to scan for saved usernames on the target system.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015
Enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery

Tropic Trooper used pr and an openly available tool to scan for open ports on target systems.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

Tropic Trooper has used scripts to collect the host's network topology.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1052.001 Exfiltration over USB Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1505.003 Web Shell Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has started a web service in the target host and wait for the adversary to connect, acting as a web shell.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has used SSL to connect to C2 servers.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has used Windows command scripts.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1106 Native API

Tropic Trooper has used multiple Windows APIs including HttpInitialize, HttpCreateHttpHandle, and HttpAddUrl.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1574.001 DLL Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.CitationCitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Tropic Trooper has monitored files' modified time.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has encrypted configuration files.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has hidden payloads in Flash directories and fake installer files.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1132.001 Standard Encoding Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has used base64 encoding to hide command strings delivered from the C2.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1078.003 Local Accounts Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1680 Local Storage Discovery

Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s system volume information.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLL Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has created the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell and sets the value to establish persistence.CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Tropic Trooper has executed commands through Microsoft security vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2012-0158.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016
Enterprise T1071.004 DNS Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper's backdoor has communicated to the C2 over the DNS protocol.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary's USBferry attack.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has injected a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe and svchost.exe.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1020 Automated Exfiltration

Tropic Trooper has used a copy function to automatically exfiltrate sensitive data from air-gapped systems using USB storage.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1135 Network Share Discovery

Tropic Trooper used netview to scan target systems for shared resources.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015
Enterprise T1082 System Information Discovery

Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s OS version.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper can search for anti-virus software running on the system.CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016
Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Tropic Trooper used shellcode with an XOR algorithm to decrypt a payload. Tropic Trooper also decrypted image files which contained a payload.CitationUnit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

Tropic Trooper has tested if the localhost network is available and other connection capability on an infected system using command scripts.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1027.003 Steganography Sub-technique

Tropic Trooper has used JPG files with encrypted payloads to mask their backdoor routines and evade detection.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1518 Software Discovery

Tropic Trooper's backdoor could list the infected system's installed software.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Enterprise T1091 Replication Through Removable Media

Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.CitationTrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Enterprise

S0452: USBferry

USBferry is an information stealing malware and has been used by Tropic Trooper in targeted attacks against Taiwanese and Philippine air-gapped military environments. USBferry shares an overlapping codebase with YAHOYAH, though it has several features which makes it a distinct piece of malware.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0596: ShadowPad

ShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. [1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0387: KeyBoy

KeyBoy is malware that has been used in targeted campaigns against members of the Tibetan Parliament in 2016.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1543.003: Windows Service Enterprise uses · Technique T1070.004: File Deletion Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Technique T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Malware S0452: USBferry Enterprise uses · Technique T1204.002: Malicious File Enterprise uses · Technique T1573: Encrypted Channel Enterprise uses · Technique T1071.001: Web Protocols Enterprise uses · Technique T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories Enterprise uses · Technique T1221: Template Injection Enterprise uses · Technique T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1046: Network Service Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery Enterprise uses · Malware S0596: ShadowPad Enterprise uses · Technique T1052.001: Exfiltration over USB Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise uses · Technique T1505.003: Web Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.003: Windows Command Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1106: Native API Enterprise uses · Technique T1574.001: DLL Enterprise uses · Technique T1083: File and Directory Discovery Enterprise uses · Malware S0012: PoisonIvy Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.6
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4dc7c4354ca737ea...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.6 Current bundle 4dc7c4354ca7…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018

    Horejsi, J., et al. (2018, March 14). Tropic Trooper’s New Strategy. Retrieved November 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016

    Ray, V. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved November 9, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020

    Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Crowdstrike Pirate Panda April 2020

    Busselen, M. (2020, April 7). On-demand Webcast: CrowdStrike Experts on COVID-19 Cybersecurity Challenges and Recommendations. Retrieved May 20, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    KeyBoy

    (Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)

  6. [6]
    Pirate Panda

    (Citation: Crowdstrike Pirate Panda April 2020)

  7. [7]
    Tropic Trooper

    (Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)

  8. [8]
    mitre-attack G0081
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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