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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0458: Ramsay

Ramsay is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between Ramsay and the Darkhotel-associated Retro malware.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0458MalwareObject v1.1 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Ramsay matters because MITRE describes it as a Windows information-stealing framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. For leaders, the key issue is not only malware removal; it is whether controls around document repositories, removable media, network shares, and isolated environments can prove that sensitive data was not silently collected, staged, or moved.

Executive priority

Prioritize Ramsay as a resilience and data-protection scenario for high-value Windows environments, especially where removable media, shared drives, or air-gapped workflows are used to protect sensitive operations. Executives should ask whether the organization can evidence control over USB use, file-share access, scheduled task abuse, stealthy execution, local data staging, and outbound web traffic. This is also relevant to audit readiness because the material question after a suspected event will be: what documents were accessible, copied, staged, or potentially transferred?

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate coverage across the behaviors linked to Ramsay: local, removable-media, and network-share data collection; file and directory discovery; process, network configuration, network connection, service, and peripheral discovery; local data staging; scheduled task persistence or execution; Visual Basic and Native API execution; DLL injection; masquerading; obfuscation, steganography, and rootkit-style stealth; removable-media replication; tainted shared content; screen capture; and web-protocol command-and-control. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for Ramsay, detection engineering should be behavior-led rather than signature-led, with special attention to Windows hosts that bridge isolated networks and removable media workflows.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry, including scripting and Visual Basic-related execution where available
  • File creation, modification, rename, copy, and delete events on local disks, removable media, and network shared drives
  • Removable media insertion, mount, file access, and policy enforcement logs
  • Windows Scheduled Task creation, modification, and execution evidence
  • Endpoint telemetry for DLL loading, process injection indicators, native API-heavy execution, and suspicious child-process patterns

Detection direction

  • Build detections around behavior chains: discovery followed by broad document access, local staging, removable-media interaction, or web-protocol communication is more meaningful than any single event.
  • Tune monitoring for sensitive document locations and shared drives, focusing on unusual enumeration, bulk access, copying, or staging from Windows endpoints and accounts that do not normally perform those actions.
  • Validate controls and alerts for removable media use, especially on systems that connect to isolated or air-gapped environments; absence of telemetry here is a major blind spot for this malware family description.
  • Review scheduled task creation and modification for unusual names, paths, or execution of scripts/binaries from user-writable, removable, or shared locations.
  • Correlate masquerading and obfuscation signals with execution context: legitimate-looking names in unusual paths, unexpected DLL loads, and suspicious script execution can reduce false positives compared with simple filename matching.

Mitigation priorities

  • Identify Windows systems that handle sensitive documents, removable media, network shares, or air-gapped transfer workflows and treat them as priority control points.
  • Restrict and monitor removable media use; disable autorun-style behavior where applicable and require approved transfer procedures for isolated environments.
  • Apply least-privilege access to document repositories and network shares, with auditing sufficient to reconstruct file access and copying during an investigation.
  • Harden execution paths with application control, script controls, and scheduled task governance to reduce abuse of Visual Basic, native execution, DLL injection, and persistence mechanisms.
  • Improve endpoint hardening and monitoring for stealth techniques such as masquerading, obfuscated files, suspicious DLL activity, and rootkit-like attempts to hide artifacts.
Analyst notes and limits

MITRE lists Ramsay as malware S0458 in enterprise ATT&CK, platform Windows, with an official description focused on information stealing and sensitive document collection/exfiltration, including from air-gapped systems. MITRE also notes researcher-identified overlaps with Darkhotel-associated Retro malware; this should be treated as research context, not as a claim of current attribution or active exploitation. The relationship set is rich and should drive defensive validation across collection, discovery, execution, persistence, lateral movement, command-and-control, and stealth behaviors.

The supplied ATT&CK object does not provide official detection guidance, aliases, labels, or object-level tactics. Several related techniques list broader platforms, but the Ramsay object itself is supplied as Windows, so local validation should focus on Windows unless separate evidence expands scope. Any assessment of exposure, compromise, or detection coverage requires environment-specific telemetry, asset context, and investigation evidence.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Ramsay

Ramsay is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between Ramsay and the Darkhotel-associated Retro malware.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

39 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1135 Network Share Discovery

Ramsay can scan for network drives which may contain documents for collection.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange Sub-technique

Ramsay has been delivered using OLE objects in malicious documents.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1113 Screen Capture

Ramsay can take screenshots every 30 seconds as well as when an external removable storage device is connected.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

Ramsay can use ipconfig and Arp to collect network configuration information, including routing information and ARP tables.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1106 Native API

Ramsay can use Windows API functions such as WriteFile, CloseHandle, and GetCurrentHwProfile during its collection and file storage operations. Ramsay can execute its embedded components via CreateProcessA and ShellExecute.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1014 Rootkit

Ramsay has included a rootkit to evade defenses.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery

Ramsay can scan for systems that are vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

Ramsay has used HTTP for C2.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1080 Taint Shared Content

Ramsay can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on networks shared drives.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

Ramsay has been distributed through spearphishing emails with malicious attachments.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

Ramsay can collect Microsoft Word documents from the target's file system, as well as .txt, .doc, and .xls files from the Internet Explorer cache.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sub-technique

Ramsay can schedule tasks via the Windows COM API to maintain persistence.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1074.001 Local Data Staging Sub-technique

Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting and %APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery

Ramsay can scan for removable media which may contain documents for collection.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1574.001 DLL Sub-technique

Ramsay can hijack outdated Windows application dependencies with malicious versions of its own DLL payload.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive

Ramsay can collect data from network drives and stage it for exfiltration.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method Sub-technique

Ramsay can store collected documents in a custom container after encrypting and compressing them using RC4 and WinRAR.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1560.001 Archive via Utility Sub-technique

Ramsay can compress and archive collected files using WinRAR.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Ramsay has been embedded in documents exploiting CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-11882, and CVE-2017-8570.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1680 Local Storage Discovery

Ramsay can detect system information--including disk names, total space, and remaining space--to create a hardware profile GUID which acts as a system identifier for operators.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1027.003 Steganography Sub-technique

Ramsay has PE data embedded within JPEG files contained within Word documents.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

Ramsay has masqueraded as a 7zip installer.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

Ramsay can gather a list of running processes by using Tasklist.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

Ramsay has created Registry Run keys to establish persistence.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Sub-technique

Ramsay can use UACMe for privilege escalation.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1036 Masquerading

Ramsay has masqueraded as a JPG image file.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

Ramsay can conduct an initial scan for Microsoft Word documents on the local system, removable media, and connected network drives, before tagging and collecting them. It can continue tagging documents to collect with follow up scans.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1091 Replication Through Removable Media

Ramsay can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on removable drives.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Ramsay can collect directory and file lists.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection Sub-technique

Ramsay can use ImprovedReflectiveDLLInjection to deploy components.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File Sub-technique

Ramsay has been executed through malicious e-mail attachments.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1059.005 Visual Basic Sub-technique

Ramsay has included embedded Visual Basic scripts in malicious documents.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header. Ramsay can also embed information within document footers.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

Ramsay can use netstat to enumerate network connections.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Ramsay can extract its agent from the body of a malicious document.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1132.001 Standard Encoding Sub-technique

Ramsay has used base64 to encode its C2 traffic.CitationAntiy CERT Ramsay April 2020
Enterprise T1559.001 Component Object Model Sub-technique

Ramsay can use the Windows COM API to schedule tasks and maintain persistence.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1025 Data from Removable Media

Ramsay can collect data from removable media and stage it for exfiltration.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Enterprise T1546.010 AppInit DLLs Sub-technique

Ramsay can insert itself into the address space of other applications using the AppInit DLL Registry key.CitationEset Ramsay May 2020
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1135: Network Share Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1559.002: Dynamic Data Exchange Enterprise uses · Technique T1113: Screen Capture Enterprise uses · Technique T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1106: Native API Enterprise uses · Technique T1014: Rootkit Enterprise uses · Technique T1046: Network Service Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1071.001: Web Protocols Enterprise uses · Technique T1080: Taint Shared Content Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Technique T1005: Data from Local System Enterprise uses · Technique T1053.005: Scheduled Task Enterprise uses · Technique T1074.001: Local Data Staging Enterprise uses · Technique T1120: Peripheral Device Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1574.001: DLL Enterprise uses · Technique T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive Enterprise uses · Technique T1560.003: Archive via Custom Method Enterprise uses · Technique T1560.001: Archive via Utility Enterprise uses · Technique T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution Enterprise uses · Technique T1680: Local Storage Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.003: Steganography Enterprise uses · Technique T1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
3c913892d2b7c0ea...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle 3c913892d2b7…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Eset Ramsay May 2020

    Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020

    Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Ramsay

    (Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attack S0458
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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