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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1518: Software Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Such software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as Software Deployment Tools, and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.

Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.

EnterpriseT1518TechniqueObject v1.5 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Software Discovery matters because it is often how an intruder decides what to do next after gaining access. By inventorying installed software and versions across endpoints, servers, ESXi, and cloud infrastructure, an adversary can identify security tools, deployment systems, backup products, or vulnerable applications that influence lateral movement, privilege escalation, evasion, or impact planning. For leaders, this is less about a single command and more about whether the organization can recognize reconnaissance inside its own environment before it becomes a broader incident.

Executive priority

Treat this as an early warning and control-validation behavior. Security leaders should ask whether SOC teams can distinguish legitimate software inventory activity from unexpected enumeration on Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, and IaaS environments. Risk owners should also confirm that software asset inventory, vulnerability management, endpoint logging, and cloud monitoring are aligned, because adversaries may use software version information to select vulnerable targets or identify widely deployed management and security tooling. The related sub-techniques for security software and backup software discovery make this especially relevant to incident readiness, recovery assurance, and audit evidence around defensive tool visibility.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists this as an Enterprise Discovery technique across ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, and Windows. MITRE does not provide official detection text for T1518, but the relationship to DET0392, Multi-Platform Software Discovery Behavior Chain, indicates detection should be behavior-chain oriented rather than dependent on one platform-specific event. SOC and detection teams should validate telemetry for process execution, software inventory queries, package or application listing activity, cloud-host or agent inventory access, and unusual access to configuration or management tooling. IR teams should treat observed software enumeration as context for possible follow-on decisions, especially where it precedes attempts to identify security tools, backup tools, broad deployment mechanisms, or vulnerable software versions.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process execution and command-line telemetry on Windows, Linux, and macOS
  • Software inventory, package manager, installed application, and version query records
  • ESXi host and management-plane logs where software or component enumeration is visible
  • IaaS audit logs for instance, agent, image, or installed software inventory access where available
  • EDR or system management telemetry showing discovery of security, monitoring, deployment, or backup tools

Detection direction

  • Build detections around unusual software and version enumeration patterns, especially when performed by unexpected users, processes, scripts, or remote sessions.
  • Correlate Software Discovery with adjacent discovery activity and with the related sub-techniques Security Software Discovery and Backup Software Discovery when enumeration focuses on defensive tools or recovery tooling.
  • Tune carefully for legitimate IT operations, vulnerability scanning, configuration management, and software deployment workflows; these can look similar without user, host, parent-process, and timing context.
  • Validate coverage across all supplied platforms rather than assuming endpoint detections on Windows cover Linux, macOS, ESXi, or IaaS environments.
  • Use relationship context from campaigns, groups, and software that use T1518 as threat-intelligence enrichment, not as proof of attribution in a local incident.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize complete, current software asset inventory so defenders can recognize unexpected enumeration and understand what an adversary may learn.
  • Harden and monitor access to software deployment, configuration management, security tooling, and backup tooling because ATT&CK notes these may shape follow-on behavior or enable broad access.
  • Ensure vulnerability management can rapidly identify exposed software versions that would be valuable if discovered by an adversary.
  • Restrict unnecessary local and cloud permissions that allow broad software or configuration enumeration.
  • Prepare incident response playbooks to investigate software discovery as a potential precursor to privilege escalation, lateral movement, defense evasion, or recovery inhibition.
Analyst notes and limits

The strongest operational value is in correlating this behavior with who performed it, from what process or session, on which platform, and what was enumerated. The presence of many ATT&CK relationships to campaigns, groups, and software shows this is a common post-compromise behavior across different actors and tools, but local evidence is required before making any attribution or severity judgment.

MITRE provides no official detection guidance for this object, and the supplied relationship to DET0392 does not include detailed detection logic. Specific commands, event IDs, cloud services, or vendor controls are not supplied in the source fields, so implementation must be adapted to the organization’s platforms, logging architecture, and approved administrative inventory processes.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Software Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Such software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as Software Deployment Tools, and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.

Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1518.001 Security Software Discovery Sub-technique Security Software Discovery subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1518.002 Backup Software Discovery Sub-technique Backup Software Discovery subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

Group Enterprise

G0124: Windigo

The Windigo group has been operating since at least 2011, compromising thousands of Linux and Unix servers using the Ebury SSH backdoor to create a spam botnet. Despite law enforcement intervention against the creators, Windigo operators continued updating Ebury through 2019.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G0100: Inception

Inception is a cyber espionage group active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple industries and governmental entities primarily in Russia, but has also been active in the United States and throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0060: BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0112: Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Group Enterprise

G1008: SideCopy

SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.[1]

Group Enterprise

G0121: Sidewinder

Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Group Enterprise

G1001: HEXANE

HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.[1][2][3][4]

Malware Enterprise

S0455: Metamorfo

Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0658: XCSSET

XCSSET is a modular macOS malware family delivered through infected Xcode projects and executed when the project is compiled. Active since August 2020, it has been observed installing backdoors, spoofed browsers, collecting data, and encrypting user files. It is composed of SHC-compiled shell scripts and run-only AppleScripts, often hiding in apps that mimic system tools (such as Xcode, Mail, or Notes) or use familiar icons (like Launchpad) to avoid detection.[1][2][3]

macOS
Tool Enterprise

S0445: ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter is a tool used by suspected Chinese adversary Mofang to automatically conduct initial discovery. The details from this discovery are used to customize follow-on payloads (such as ShimRat) as well as set up faux infrastructure which mimics the adversary's targets. ShimRatReporter has been used in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1153: Cuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. Cuckoo Stealer is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.[1][2]

macOS
Malware Enterprise

S1042: SUGARDUMP

SUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0126: ComRAT

ComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.[1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Malware Enterprise

S0384: Dridex

Dridex is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated Dridex had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).[1][2][3]

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0014: Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]

Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
4890b0e3f9de0f3a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.5 Current bundle 4890b0e3f9de…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    mitre-attack T1518
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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