T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories
Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [1] [2]. Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app [3]. On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Additionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Hidden files and directories matter because they can cause routine user review, basic file browsing, and incomplete triage to miss adversary-staged content on Linux, macOS, and Windows systems. For leaders, the issue is not the hidden attribute itself—many legitimate applications use hidden files—but whether SOC and incident response processes can reliably surface suspicious hidden content when investigating stealthy activity.
Executive priority
Treat this as a resilience and evidence-quality issue. If endpoint inventories, EDR queries, forensic collection, and IR playbooks do not explicitly account for hidden files and directories, investigations may under-scope incidents and miss persistence, tooling, or data staging artifacts. Security leaders should ask whether hidden-file visibility is tested across Windows, macOS, and Linux and whether analysts have documented procedures to distinguish normal application-created hidden files from suspicious ones.
Technical view
ATT&CK lists this sub-technique under stealth for Linux, macOS, and Windows. Detection text is not provided, so teams should validate local telemetry and process coverage rather than assume a standard analytic exists. SOC and IR teams should confirm that endpoint collection, file-system search, and triage tooling include hidden files, dot-prefixed files and directories on Linux/macOS, macOS hidden flags where visible to tooling, Windows hidden attributes, and unusual filenames such as names that are difficult to see in normal interfaces. Analysis should focus on context: location, creation time, associated process/user, recent execution, and whether the item aligns with legitimate application behavior.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint file creation and modification events
- File attribute or metadata changes
- Directory listings and forensic file-system collection that include hidden items
- Process execution records associated with file or attribute changes
- User/account context for file creation or modification
Detection direction
- Validate that collection tools do not omit hidden files by default during triage or scheduled inventory.
- Tune detections around suspicious hidden files in unusual locations, recently created hidden content, or hidden items associated with suspicious process activity.
- Account for high false-positive potential because many legitimate applications create hidden files and folders.
- Test analyst workflows on Linux/macOS dot-prefixed files, macOS Finder-hidden content, Windows hidden attributes, and visually ambiguous filenames.
- Use incident context rather than hidden status alone; hidden files are a signal for review, not proof of malicious activity.
Mitigation priorities
- Ensure IR and SOC procedures explicitly require showing and collecting hidden files and directories across supported operating systems.
- Standardize endpoint telemetry and forensic collection settings so hidden items are included during investigations.
- Maintain baselines or allowlists for common legitimate hidden application directories to reduce analyst noise.
- Apply least-privilege and change-monitoring practices so unexpected file creation or attribute changes are easier to investigate.
- Include hidden-file visibility checks in detection engineering validation, tabletop exercises, and compliance evidence where endpoint monitoring coverage is in scope.
Analyst notes and limits
This object has no supplied external references or relationship context, and the official ATT&CK detection field is not provided. The strongest practical use is as a control-validation prompt: confirm visibility, collection completeness, and analyst procedures for hidden content on Linux, macOS, and Windows.
This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields. It does not assert active exploitation, specific malware use, attribution, impact, or guaranteed detection. Local operating system configuration, endpoint tooling, logging depth, and normal application behavior are required to determine risk and detection quality.
Hidden Files and Directories
Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name [1] [2]. Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app [3]. On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Additionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1158 | Hidden Files and Directories | Hidden Files and Directories revoked by this object. |
| Enterprise | T1564 | Hide Artifacts | This object subtechnique of Hide Artifacts. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0007: APT28
APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.
G1039: RedCurl
RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks.[1] RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor.[1][2] The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.
G1014: LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.[1][2]
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
G0129: Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]
G0081: Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]
G0046: FIN7
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G0106: Rocke
Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "rocke@live.cn" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.[1]
G1016: FIN13
G0134: Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]
G0125: HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]
G0050: APT32
APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]
S0650: QakBot
S0658: XCSSET
XCSSET is a modular macOS malware family delivered through infected Xcode projects and executed when the project is compiled. Active since August 2020, it has been observed installing backdoors, spoofed browsers, collecting data, and encrypting user files. It is composed of SHC-compiled shell scripts and run-only AppleScripts, often hiding in apps that mimic system tools (such as Xcode, Mail, or Notes) or use familiar icons (like Launchpad) to avoid detection.[1][2][3]
S1153: Cuckoo Stealer
Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. Cuckoo Stealer is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.[1][2]
S0660: Clambling
Clambling is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2017.[1]
S0612: WastedLocker
WastedLocker is a ransomware family attributed to Indrik Spider that has been used since at least May 2020. WastedLocker has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.[1][2][3]
S0013: PlugX
S0369: CoinTicker
CoinTicker is a malicious application that poses as a cryptocurrency price ticker and installs components of the open source backdoors EvilOSX and EggShell.[1]
S0428: PoetRAT
PoetRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. PoetRAT has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. PoetRAT derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. [1][2][3]
S0584: AppleJeus
AppleJeus is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. AppleJeus has been used by Lazarus Group, targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. AppleJeus has been used to distribute the FALLCHILL RAT.[1]
S1219: REPTILE
S0402: OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.[1][2]
S0595: ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest is a virus, data stealer, and wiper that presents itself as ransomware targeting macOS systems. ThiefQuest was first seen in 2020 distributed via trojanized pirated versions of popular macOS software on Russian forums sharing torrent links.[1] Even though ThiefQuest presents itself as ransomware, since the dynamically generated encryption key is never sent to the attacker it may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware.[2][3]
C0047: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations
RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations was executed by Mustang Panda from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load PlugX on victim machines in a persistent state.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 5eb6e147a9b2… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Sofacy Komplex Trojan
Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
Open source URL -
[2]
Antiquated Mac Malware
Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
Open source URL -
[3]
WireLurker
Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
Open source URL -
[4]
mitre-attack T1564.001Open source URL
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