T1556.008: Network Provider DLL
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.[1] During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.[2][3][4]
Adversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`.[5] Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.[4]
Adversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.[2]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1556.008: Network Provider DLL describes Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation: Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in clea...
Executive priority
T1556.008: Network Provider DLL is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1556.008: Network Provider DLL by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (defense-impairment, persistence, credential-access), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1556.008: Network Provider DLL appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Network Provider DLL
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.[1] During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.[2][3][4]
Adversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`.[5] Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.[4]
Adversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.[2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1556 | Modify Authentication Process | This object subtechnique of Modify Authentication Process. |
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 3f8e03f99dfa… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Older bundle | 3f8e03f99dfa… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Network Provider API
Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Network Provider API. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]NPPSPY - Huntress
Dray Agha. (2022, August 16). Cleartext Shenanigans: Gifting User Passwords to Adversaries With NPPSPY. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]NPPSPY Video
Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 14). How winlogon.exe shares the cleartext password with custom DLLs. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
Open source URL - [4]NPLogonNotify
Microsoft. (2021, October 21). NPLogonNotify function (npapi.h). Retrieved March 30, 2023.
Open source URL - [5]NPPSPY
Grzegorz Tworek. (2021, December 15). NPPSpy. Retrieved March 30, 2023.
Open source URL - [6]mitre-attackT1556.008Open source URL
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