LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T0861: Point & Tag Identification

Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. [1] Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.

Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.

ICST0861TechniqueObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T0861: Point & Tag Identification describes Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points b...

Executive priority

T0861: Point & Tag Identification is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T0861: Point & Tag Identification by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (None), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T0861: Point & Tag Identification appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Point & Tag Identification

Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. [1] Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.

Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareICS

S1045: INCONTROLLER

INCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.[1][2][3][4][5]

Engineering WorkstationField Controller/RTU/PLC/IEDSafety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · MitigationM0937: Filter Network TrafficICSmitigates · MitigationM0930: Network SegmentationICSmitigates · MitigationM0801: Access ManagementICSmitigates · MitigationM0804: Human User AuthenticationICSmitigates · MitigationM0813: Software Process and Device AuthenticationICSmitigates · MitigationM0807: Network AllowlistsICSmitigates · MitigationM0802: Communication AuthenticityICSmitigates · MitigationM0800: Authorization EnforcementICSuses · MalwareS0093: Backdoor.OldreaICSuses · MalwareS1045: INCONTROLLERICStargets · ICS AssetA0004: Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)ICStargets · ICS AssetA0017: Distributed Control System (DCS) ControllerICStargets · ICS AssetA0009: Data GatewayICStargets · ICS AssetA0010: Safety ControllerICStargets · ICS AssetA0007: Control ServerICStargets · ICS AssetA0002: Human-Machine Interface (HMI)ICStargets · ICS AssetA0005: Intelligent Electronic Device (IED)ICStargets · ICS AssetA0006: Data HistorianICStargets · ICS AssetA0018: Programmable Automation Controller (PAC)ICStargets · ICS AssetA0003: Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)ICSdetects · Detection StrategyDET0788: Detection of Point & Tag IdentificationICS
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationICS

M0937: Filter Network Traffic

Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]

MitigationICS

M0930: Network Segmentation

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]

MitigationICS

M0801: Access Management

Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provide sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]

MitigationICS

M0804: Human User Authentication

Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and User Account Control.

MitigationICS

M0813: Software Process and Device Authentication

Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.

MitigationICS

M0807: Network Allowlists

Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.

MitigationICS

M0802: Communication Authenticity

When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.

MitigationICS

M0800: Authorization Enforcement

The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
54c196c84d14c38b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle54c196c84d14…
19.11.1Older bundle54c196c84d14…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016

    Dennis L. Sloatman 2016, September 16 Understanding PLC Programming Methods and the Tag Database System Retrieved. 2017/12/19

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackT0861
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use