S9052: MiniFast

MiniFast is a custom malware designed for long-term persistence and remote code execution. MiniFast is a modular malware suspected of being generated using artificial intelligence (AI). MiniFast was first observed in early-2026 and is a modified version of the MiniJunk framework. MiniFast has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]

EnterpriseS9052MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedOct 1, 2026, 20:46 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S9052: MiniFast describes [MiniFast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052) is a custom malware designed for long-term persistence and remote code execution. [MiniFast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052) is a modular malware suspected of being generated using artificial intelligence (AI). [MiniFast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052) was first observed in early-2026 and is a modified version of the [MiniJunk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053) framework. [MiniFast](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9052) has been affili...

Executive priority

S9052: MiniFast is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9052: MiniFast by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S9052: MiniFast appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

MiniFast

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques21 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	MiniFast has the ability to upload files over C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	MiniFast has the ability to download additional files from C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code SigningSub-technique	MiniFast has leveraged valid digital signatures from SSL[.]com to appear legitimate.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	MiniFast has collected data from local files and directories on the victim device.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	MiniFast has encoded C2 instructions with Base64.[1]
Enterprise	T1489	Service Stop	MiniFast has the ability to terminate a process using its PID.[1]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	MiniFast has created scheduled tasks using the name “WindowsSecurityUpdate.”[1]
Enterprise	T1036.012	Browser FingerprintSub-technique	MiniFast has blended into network traffic by mimicking a Chrome browser using the following User-Agent string: `Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36`.[1]
Enterprise	T1134.002	Create Process with TokenSub-technique	MiniFast has the ability to execute a process with elevated privileges using `runas`.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	MiniFast has decoded Base64-encoded tasks from the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	MiniFast has collected the username on targeted systems.[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	MiniFast has the ability to check running processes and has returned process names and their PIDs. MiniFast has also checked its relative parent process.[1]
Enterprise	T1560.001	Archive via UtilitySub-technique	MiniFast has the ability to archive files and directories using ZIP.[1]
Enterprise	T1680	Local Storage Discovery	MiniFast has enumerated logical drives on impacted devices.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	MiniFast has utilized HTTP POST, GET and PUT requests for communications with the C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	MiniFast has listed files and folders within a specified directory.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	MiniFast has collected the victim's username, hostname and domain information.[1]
Enterprise	T1074.001	Local Data StagingSub-technique	MiniFast has the ability to move data within the victim machine.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	MiniFast has executed commands using `cmd.exe`.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	MiniFast has the ability to delete files and directories.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.015	CompressionSub-technique	MiniFast has been delivered within a malicious zip file.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1059: NIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE is a State Sponsored cyber espionage group associated with the Iranian Regime specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). NIMBUS MANTICORE has employed social engineering attacks to include HR related themes and has leveraged custom malware against its victims. NIMBUS MANTICORE has sought sensitive information in victims’ environments to include network/IT documentation, intellectual property and emails. NIMBUS MANTICORE has also leveraged compromised organizations as pivot points to access other organizations of interest. NIMBUS MANTICORE has been active since 2021 and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations to include aviation, aerospace, telecommunications and defense and information technology related organizations within the United States, Australia, Midde East and Europe.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 20.0
Object version: 1.0
Created: Sep 24, 2026, 18:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 1, 2026, 20:46 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 761a887b4e4a470e...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
20.0	Oct 18, 2026, 20:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 1, 2026, 20:46 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`761a887b4e4a…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026
Check Point. (2026, May 22). Fast and Furious – Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict. Retrieved September 23, 2026.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS9052
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use