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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S9053: MiniJunk

MiniJunk is a custom malware designed for long-term persistence and remote code execution.[1] MiniJunk  was first observed in 2025 and is a modified version of the MiniBike framework that was first observed in June 2022.[1] MiniJunk has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]

EnterpriseS9053MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S9053: MiniJunk describes [MiniJunk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053) is a custom malware designed for long-term persistence and remote code execution.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025) [MiniJunk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053) was first observed in 2025 and is a modified version of the [MiniBike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9059) framework that was first observed in June 2022.(Citation: CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025) [MiniJunk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9053) has been affilia...

Executive priority

S9053: MiniJunk is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9053: MiniJunk by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S9053: MiniJunk appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

MiniJunk

MiniJunk is a custom malware designed for long-term persistence and remote code execution.[1] MiniJunk  was first observed in 2025 and is a modified version of the MiniBike framework that was first observed in June 2022.[1] MiniJunk has been affiliated with the cyber espionage threat group NIMBUS MANTICORE.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

MiniJunk has collected the domain name with username.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.016Junk Code InsertionSub-technique

MiniJunk has been compiled through several obfuscation techniques to include junk code insertion.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

MiniJunk has utilized Windows API calls to make HTTPs requests to C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

MiniJunk has been executed using the auto-run registry key `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MigAutoPlay` that executes the benign windows executable `MigAutoPlay`.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

MiniJunk has the ability to load a DLL from the C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

MiniJunk has listed all hard drives or has listed files within a specified directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

MiniJunk has leveraged HTTPS calls to the C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

MiniJunk has leveraged legitimate digital signatures from SSL[.]com to appear legitimate.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

MiniJunk has encoded network data by converting strings into bytes, then reversing the bytes and the entire strings. MiniJunk has also encrypted strings to obfuscate code.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

MiniJunk has a command that is capable of deleting a file.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

MiniJunk has been delivered within a malicious zip file.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

MiniJunk has the ability to move or rename files.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

MiniJunk has obfuscated code that utilized junk code insertion, control-flow obfuscation, opaque predicates, obfuscated function calls, and encrypted strings to hinder analysis.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

MiniJunk has the ability to validate running processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

MiniJunk has the ability to gather the computer name.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1059: NIMBUS MANTICORE

NIMBUS MANTICORE is a State Sponsored cyber espionage group associated with the Iranian Regime specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). NIMBUS MANTICORE has employed social engineering attacks to include HR related themes and has leveraged custom malware against its victims. NIMBUS MANTICORE has sought sensitive information in victims’ environments to include network/IT documentation, intellectual property and emails. NIMBUS MANTICORE has also leveraged compromised organizations as pivot points to access other organizations of interest. NIMBUS MANTICORE has been active since 2021 and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations to include aviation, aerospace, telecommunications and defense and information technology related organizations within the United States, Australia, Midde East and Europe.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.016: Junk Code InsertionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553.002: Code SigningEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · GroupG1059: NIMBUS MANTICOREEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8a2f25a0d0876180...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle8a2f25a0d087…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025

    Check Point. (2025, September 22). Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe. Retrieved September 24, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS9053
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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