S1201: TRANSLATEXT
TRANSLATEXT is malware that is believed to be used by Kimsuky.[1] TRANSLATEXT masqueraded as a Google Translate extension for Google Chrome, but is actually a collection of four malicious Javascript files that perform defense evasion, information collection and exfiltration.[1]
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TRANSLATEXT
TRANSLATEXT is malware that is believed to be used by Kimsuky.[1] TRANSLATEXT masqueraded as a Google Translate extension for Google Chrome, but is actually a collection of four malicious Javascript files that perform defense evasion, information collection and exfiltration.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has used HTTP to communicate with the C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has stolen credentials stored in Chrome.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has used PowerShell to collect system information and to upload the collected data to a Github repository.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected credentials to the C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | TRANSLATEXT has modified the following registry key to install itself as the value, granting permission to install specified extensions: ` HKCU\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1185 | Browser Session Hijacking | TRANSLATEXT has the ability to use form-grabbing and event-listening to extract data from web data forms.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102.001 | Dead Drop ResolverSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has used a dead drop resolver to retrieve configurations and commands from a public blog site.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated updated cookies from Google, Naver, Kakao or Daum to the C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | TRANSLATEXT has the ability to capture screenshots of new browser tabs, based on the presence of the `Capture` flag.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1176.001 | Browser ExtensionsSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has the ability to capture credentials, cookies, browser screenshots, etc. and to exfiltrate data.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has been named `GoogleTranslate.crx` to masquerade as a legitimate Chrome extension.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1114 | Email Collection | TRANSLATEXT has exfiltrated collected email addresses to the C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | TRANSLATEXT has used a Github repository for C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | TRANSLATEXT has queried the following registry key to check for installed Chrome extensions: ` HKCU\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallForcelist `.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1205 | Traffic Signaling | TRANSLATEXT has redirected clients to legitimate Gmail, Naver or Kakao pages if the clients connect with no parameters.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 401ba48159dc… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 401ba48159dc… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 401ba48159dc… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Zscaler Kimsuky TRANSLATEXT
Park, S. (2024, June 27). Kimsuky deploys TRANSLATEXT to target South Korean academia. Retrieved October 14, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1201Open source URL
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