S1183: StrelaStealer

S1183: StrelaStealer describes [StrelaStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1183) is an information stealer malware variant first identified in November 2022 and active through late 2024. [StrelaStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1183) focuses on the automated identification, collection, and exfiltration of email credentials from email clients such as Outlook and Thunderbird.(Citation: DCSO StrelaStealer 2022)(Citation: PaloAlto StrelaStealer 2024)(Citation: Fortgale StrelaStealer 2023)(Citation: IBM StrelaStealer 2024)

Executive priority

S1183: StrelaStealer is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1183: StrelaStealer by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1183: StrelaStealer appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

StrelaStealer

StrelaStealer is an information stealer malware variant first identified in November 2022 and active through late 2024. StrelaStealer focuses on the automated identification, collection, and exfiltration of email credentials from email clients such as Outlook and Thunderbird.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques34 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1001	Data Obfuscation	StrelaStealer encrypts the payload of HTTP POST communications using the same XOR key used for the malware's DLL payload.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	StrelaStealer exfiltrates collected email credentials via HTTP POST to command and control servers.[1][2][3][4]
Enterprise	T1027.016	Junk Code InsertionSub-technique	StrelaStealer variants have included excessive mathematical functions padding the binary and slowing execution for anti-analysis and sandbox evasion purposes.[3]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	StrelaStealer communicates externally via HTTP POST with encrypted content.[1][3][4]
Enterprise	T1622	Debugger Evasion	StrelaStealer variants include functionality to identify and evade debuggers.[3]
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	StrelaStealer has been distributed in ISO archives.[1] StrelaStealer has been delivered in encrypted, password-protected ZIP archives.[4]
Enterprise	T1553.002	Code SigningSub-technique	StrelaStealer variants have used valid code signing certificates.[4]
Enterprise	T1480	Execution Guardrails	StrelaStealer variants only execute if the keyboard layout or language matches a set list of variables.[3][4]
Enterprise	T1036.003	Rename Legitimate UtilitiesSub-technique	StrelaStealer has used a renamed, legitimate `msinfo32.exe` executable to sideload the StrelaStealer payload during initial installation.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	StrelaStealer relies on user execution of a malicious file for installation.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	StrelaStealer uses XOR-encoded strings to obfuscate items.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.007	JavaScriptSub-technique	StrelaStealer has been distributed as a malicious JavaScript object.[2][3][4]
Enterprise	T1218.011	Rundll32Sub-technique	StrelaStealer DLL payloads have been executed via `rundll32.exe`.[2][4]
Enterprise	T1518	Software Discovery	StrelaStealer variants use COM objects to enumerate installed applications from the "AppsFolder" on victim machines.[4]
Enterprise	T1027.002	Software PackingSub-technique	StrelaStealer variants have used packers to obfuscate payloads and make analysis more difficult.[2]
Enterprise	T1059.001	PowerShellSub-technique	StrelaStealer variants have used PowerShell scripts to download or drop payloads, including obfuscated variants to connect to a WebDAV server to download and executed an encrypted DLL for installation.[4]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	StrelaStealer has included BAT files in some instances for installation.[3][4]
Enterprise	T1497	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	StrelaStealer payloads have used control flow obfuscation techniques such as excessively long code blocks of mathematical instructions to defeat sandboxing and related analysis methods.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1566.001	Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique	StrelaStealer has been distributed as a spearphishing attachment.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.015	CompressionSub-technique	StrelaStealer has been delivered via JScript files in a ZIP archive.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1552.002	Credentials in RegistrySub-technique	StrelaStealer enumerates the registry key `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676\` to identify the values for "IMAP User," "IMAP Server," and "IMAP Password" associated with the Outlook email application.[1][3][4]
Enterprise	T1036	Masquerading	StrelaStealer PE executable payloads have used uncommon but legitimate extensions such as `.com` instead of `.exe`.[4]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	StrelaStealer utilizes a hard-coded XOR key to encrypt the content of HTTP POST requests to command and control infrastructure.[4]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	StrelaStealer has sideloaded a DLL payload using a renamed, legitimate `msinfo32.exe` executable.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	StrelaStealer payloads have tailored filenames to include names identical to the name of the targeted organization or company.[4]
Enterprise	T1614.001	System Language DiscoverySub-technique	StrelaStealer variants check system language settings via keyboard layout or similar mechanisms.[3][4]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	StrelaStealer payloads have included strings encrypted via XOR.[1] StrelaStealer JavaScript payloads utilize Base64-encoded payloads that are decoded via certutil to create a malicious DLL file.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	StrelaStealer installers have used obfuscated PowerShell scripts to retrieve follow-on payloads from WebDAV servers.[4]
Enterprise	T1480.002	Mutual ExclusionSub-technique	StrelaStealer variants include the use of mutex values based on the victim system name to prevent reinfection.[3]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	StrelaStealer variants collect victim system information for exfiltration.[4]
Enterprise	T1552.001	Credentials In FilesSub-technique	StrelaStealer searches for and if found collects the contents of files such as `logins.json` and `key4.db` in the `$APPDATA%\Thunderbird\Profiles\` directory, associated with the Thunderbird email application.[1][3]
Enterprise	T1119	Automated Collection	StrelaStealer attempts to identify and collect mail login data from Thunderbird and Outlook following execution.[1][2][3][4]
Enterprise	T1036.008	Masquerade File TypeSub-technique	StrelaStealer has been distributed as a DLL/HTML polyglot file.[1][4]
Enterprise	T1020	Automated Exfiltration	StrelaStealer automatically sends gathered email credentials following collection to command and control servers via HTTP POST.[1][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Dec 31, 2024, 16:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Mar 10, 2025, 18:57 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 45e86b27412cd0b3...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Mar 10, 2025, 18:57 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`45e86b27412c…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Mar 10, 2025, 18:57 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`45e86b27412c…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
DCSO StrelaStealer 2022
DCSO CyTec Blog. (2022, November 8). #ShortAndMalicious: StrelaStealer aims for mail credentials. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
PaloAlto StrelaStealer 2024
Benjamin Chang, Goutam Tripathy, Pranay Kumar Chhaparwal, Anmol Maurya & Vishwa Thothathri, Palo Alto Networks. (2024, March 22). Large-Scale StrelaStealer Campaign in Early 2024. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
Open source URL
[3]
Fortgale StrelaStealer 2023
Fortgale. (2023, September 18). StrelaStealer Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
Open source URL
[4]
IBM StrelaStealer 2024
Golo Mühr, Joe Fasulo & Charlotte Hammond, IBM X-Force. (2024, November 12). Strela Stealer: Today’s invoice is tomorrow’s phish. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
Open source URL
[5]
mitre-attackS1183
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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