S1076: QUIETCANARY
QUIETCANARY is a backdoor tool written in .NET that has been used since at least 2022 to gather and exfiltrate data from victim networks.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1076: QUIETCANARY describes [QUIETCANARY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1076) is a backdoor tool written in .NET that has been used since at least 2022 to gather and exfiltrate data from victim networks.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Executive priority
S1076: QUIETCANARY is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1076: QUIETCANARY by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1076: QUIETCANARY appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
QUIETCANARY
QUIETCANARY is a backdoor tool written in .NET that has been used since at least 2022 to gather and exfiltrate data from victim networks.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | QUIETCANARY can RC4 encrypt C2 communications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | QUIETCANARY can use a custom parsing routine to decode the command codes and additional parameters from the C2 before executing them.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | QUIETCANARY can identify the default proxy setting on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | QUIETCANARY can execute processes in a hidden window.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | QUIETCANARY has the ability to stage data prior to exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | QUIETCANARY can call `System.Net.HttpWebRequest` to identify the default proxy configured on the victim computer.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | QUIETCANARY can use HTTPS for C2 communications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | QUIETCANARY has the ability to retrieve information from the Registry.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | QUIETCANARY can base64 encode C2 communications.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0026: C0026
C0026 was a campaign identified in September 2022 that included the selective distribution of KOPILUWAK and QUIETCANARY malware to previous ANDROMEDA malware victims in Ukraine through re-registered ANDROMEDA C2 domains. Several tools and tactics used during C0026 were consistent with historic Turla operations.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b080d2a73ed9… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b080d2a73ed9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023
Hawley, S. et al. (2023, February 2). Turla: A Galaxy of Opportunity. Retrieved May 15, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Tunnus
(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
- [3]mitre-attackS1076Open source URL
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