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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1059: metaMain

metaMain is a backdoor used by Metador to maintain long-term access to compromised machines; it has also been used to decrypt Mafalda into memory.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1059MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1059: metaMain describes [metaMain](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1059) is a backdoor used by [Metador](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1013) to maintain long-term access to compromised machines; it has also been used to decrypt [Mafalda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1060) into memory.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022)

Executive priority

S1059: metaMain is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1059: metaMain by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1059: metaMain appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

metaMain

metaMain is a backdoor used by Metador to maintain long-term access to compromised machines; it has also been used to decrypt Mafalda into memory.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

28 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

metaMain can collect the username from a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

metaMain's module file has been encrypted via XOR.[2]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

metaMain can enumerate the processes that run on the platform.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

metaMain has stored the collected system files in a working directory.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

metaMain can establish an indirect and raw TCP socket-based connection to the C2 server.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionSub-technique

metaMain registered a WMI event subscription consumer called "hard_disk_stat" to establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1620Reflective Code Loading

metaMain has reflectively loaded a DLL to read, decrypt, and load an orchestrator file.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

metaMain can write the process ID of a target process into the `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\DDE\tpid` Registry value as part of its reflective loading activity.[2]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

metaMain can decrypt and load other modules.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.003Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique

metaMain has used XOR-based encryption for collected files before exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1056Input Capture

metaMain can log mouse events.[2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

metaMain can execute an operator-provided Windows command by leveraging functions such as `WinExec`, `WriteFile`, and `ReadFile`.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

metaMain can take and save screenshots.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

metaMain can use HTTP for C2 communications.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1497.003Time Based ChecksSub-technique

metaMain has delayed execution for five to six minutes during its persistence establishment process.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

metaMain can collect files and system information from a compromised host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

metaMain can recursively enumerate files in an operator-provided directory.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

metaMain can upload collected files and data to its C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1090.001Internal ProxySub-technique

metaMain can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.[2]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

metaMain can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.[2]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

metaMain can download files onto compromised systems.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

metaMain has deleted collected items after uploading the content to its C2 server.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

metaMain has the ability to log keyboard events.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

metaMain can encrypt the data that it sends and receives from the C2 server using an RC4 encryption algorithm.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070.006TimestompSub-technique

metaMain can change the `CreationTime`, `LastAccessTime`, and `LastWriteTime` file time attributes when executed with `SYSTEM` privileges.[2]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

metaMain can inject the loader file, Speech02.db, into a process.[1]

EnterpriseT1205.001Port KnockingSub-technique

metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

metaMain can collect the computer name from a compromised host.[2]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1013: Metador

Metador is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. Metador has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group Metador based on the "I am meta" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
03c6eb450a721f71...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.1Current bundle03c6eb450a72…
19.21.1Older bundle03c6eb450a72…
19.11.1Older bundle03c6eb450a72…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022

    Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022

    SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS1059
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.