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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1026: Mongall

Mongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.[1]

EnterpriseS1026MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1026: Mongall describes [Mongall](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1026) is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by [Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007).(Citation: SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022)

Executive priority

S1026: Mongall is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1026: Mongall by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1026: Mongall appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Mongall

Mongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Mongall can use HTTP for C2 communication.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Mongall has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

Mongall has relied on a user opening a malicious document for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1120Peripheral Device Discovery

Mongall can identify removable media attached to compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Mongall can identify drives on compromised hosts.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

Mongall has the ability to RC4 encrypt C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

Mongall can use `rundll32.exe` for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Mongall has the ability to upload files from victim's machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

Mongall can use Base64 to encode information sent to its C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Mongall can download files to targeted systems.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Mongall can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

Mongall can inject a DLL into `rundll32.exe` for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Mongall can retrieve the hostname via `gethostbyname`.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

Mongall has been packed with Themida.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Mongall can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value `EverNoteTrayUService`.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1007: Aoqin Dragon

Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG1007: Aoqin DragonEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1120: Peripheral Device DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055.001: Dynamic-link Library InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d64e7df41bb5e208...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundled64e7df41bb5…
19.11.1Older bundled64e7df41bb5…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022

    Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1026
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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