G1007: Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1007: Aoqin Dragon describes [Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. [Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007) has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between [Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007) and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.(Citati...
Executive priority
G1007: Aoqin Dragon is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1007: Aoqin Dragon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1007: Aoqin Dragon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Aoqin Dragon has lured victims into opening weaponized documents, fake external drives, and fake antivirus to execute malicious payloads.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Aoqin Dragon has spread malware in target networks by copying modules to folders masquerading as removable devices.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | Aoqin Dragon has used a dropper that employs a worm infection strategy using a removable device to breach a secure network environment.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | Aoqin Dragon has used the Themida packer to obfuscate malicious payloads.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1587.001 | MalwareSub-technique | Aoqin Dragon has used custom malware, including Mongall and Heyoka Backdoor, in their operations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Aoqin Dragon has run scripts to identify file formats including Microsoft Word.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | Aoqin Dragon has used fake icons including antivirus and external drives to disguise malicious payloads.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | Aoqin Dragon obtained the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool and subsequently modified it for their operations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Aoqin Dragon has exploited CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 for execution against targeted systems.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1026: Mongall
Mongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.[1]
S1027: Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 949a1abee6e4… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 4a71277222f7… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SentinelOne Aoqin Dragon June 2022
Chen, Joey. (2022, June 9). Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackG1007Open source URL
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