LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1017: OutSteel

OutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.[1]

EnterpriseS1017MalwareObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1017: OutSteel describes [OutSteel](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1017) is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by [Saint Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1031) since at least March 2021.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )

Executive priority

S1017: OutSteel is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1017: OutSteel by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1017: OutSteel appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

OutSteel

OutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

OutSteel has used `cmd.exe` to scan a compromised host for specific file extensions.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

OutSteel can upload files from a compromised host over its C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

OutSteel has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

OutSteel has relied on a user to click a malicious link within a spearphishing email.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

OutSteel can collect information from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1020Automated Exfiltration

OutSteel can automatically upload collected files to its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.010AutoHotKey & AutoITSub-technique

OutSteel was developed using the AutoIT scripting language.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

OutSteel can search for specific file extensions, including zipped files.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

OutSteel can automatically scan for and collect files with specific extensions.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

OutSteel has relied on a user to execute a malicious attachment delivered via spearphishing.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

OutSteel has been distributed as a malicious attachment within a spearphishing email.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

OutSteel can delete itself following the successful execution of a follow-on payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1570Lateral Tool Transfer

OutSteel can download the Saint Bot malware for follow-on execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

OutSteel has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

OutSteel can download files from its C2 server.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

OutSteel can identify running processes on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

OutSteel attempts to download and execute Saint Bot to a statically-defined location attempting to mimic svchost: %TEMP%\\svjhost.exe.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1031: Saint Bear

Saint Bear is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, Saint Bot, and information stealer, OutSteel in campaigns. Saint Bear typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities.[1][2] Saint Bear has previously been confused with Ember Bear operations, but analysis of behaviors, tools, and targeting indicates these are distinct clusters.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
07bdaa10c1bf1063...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle07bdaa10c1bf…
19.12.0Older bundle07bdaa10c1bf…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022

    Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1017
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.