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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0688: Meteor

Meteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called "Indra" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.[1]

EnterpriseS0688MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0688: Meteor describes [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called "Indra" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)

Executive priority

S0688: Meteor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0688: Meteor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0688: Meteor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Meteor

Meteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called "Indra" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

20 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

Meteor can use `wmic.exe` as part of its effort to delete shadow copies.[1]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Meteor can disconnect all network adapters on a compromised host using `powershell -Command "Get-WmiObject -class Win32_NetworkAdapter | ForEach { If ($.NetEnabled) { $.Disable() } }" > NUL`.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Meteor has the ability to download additional files for execution on the victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Meteor has been disguised as the Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool.[1]

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

Meteor can use Wevtutil to remove Security, System and Application Event Viewer logs.[1]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Meteor can attempt to uninstall Kaspersky Antivirus or remove the Kaspersky license; it can also add all files and folders related to the attack to the Windows Defender exclusion list.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Meteor can use `WinAPI` to remove a victim machine from an Active Directory domain.[1]

EnterpriseT1491.001Internal DefacementSub-technique

Meteor can change both the desktop wallpaper and the lock screen image to a custom image.[1]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Meteor execution begins from a scheduled task named `Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll` and it creates a separate scheduled task called `mstask` to run the wiper only once at 23:55:00.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

Meteor can use PowerShell commands to disable the network adapters on a victim machines.[1]

EnterpriseT1531Account Access Removal

Meteor has the ability to change the password of local users on compromised hosts and can log off users.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Meteor has the ability to discover the hostname of a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1564.003Hidden WindowSub-technique

Meteor can hide its console window upon execution to decrease its visibility to a victim.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Meteor can run `set.bat`, `update.bat`, `cache.bat`, `bcd.bat`, `msrun.bat`, and similar scripts.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

Meteor can use `bcdedit` to delete different boot identifiers on a compromised host; it can also use `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet` and `C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`.[1]

EnterpriseT1485Data Destruction

Meteor can fill a victim's files and directories with zero-bytes in replacement of real content before deleting them.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

Meteor has the ability to search for Kaspersky Antivirus on a victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Meteor will delete the folder containing malicious scripts if it detects the hostname as `PIS-APP`, `PIS-MOB`, `WSUSPROXY`, or `PIS-DB`.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Meteor can check if a specific process is running, such as Kaspersky's `avp.exe`.[1]

EnterpriseT1484.001Group Policy ModificationSub-technique

Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
5f26a84253eefb8e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle5f26a84253ee…
19.11.0Older bundle5f26a84253ee…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Check Point Meteor Aug 2021

    Check Point Research Team. (2021, August 14). Indra - Hackers Behind Recent Attacks on Iran. Retrieved February 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0688
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.