S0625: Cuba
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Cuba is a Windows-based ransomware family in ATT&CK, described by MITRE as used against financial institutions, technology, and logistics organizations in North and South America and Europe since at least December 2019. Its mapped behaviors matter because they span pre-impact discovery, execution through PowerShell and Windows command shell, stealth through obfuscation and hidden execution, credential-related collection via keylogging, service manipulation, and data encryption for impact. For leaders, this is less about one malware name and more about validating whether Windows ransomware tradecraft would be visible before encryption disrupts operations.
Executive priority
Prioritize Cuba as a ransomware resilience validation case for Windows environments. The decision questions are: can the organization detect discovery and service manipulation before encryption, can IR teams reconstruct activity if files are deleted or payloads are packed/obfuscated, and are backup, service recovery, and evidence-retention processes ready for a disruptive ransomware event? The ATT&CK record supports heightened attention for sectors named in the source description—financial institutions, technology, and logistics—but local exposure should be determined from asset criticality, Windows dependency, telemetry coverage, and recovery readiness.
Technical view
The malware object has no ATT&CK-provided detection text, so SOC and detection engineering work should be driven by the mapped techniques and the Windows platform. Validate visibility for PowerShell and cmd execution, Windows service creation or modification, access token manipulation, process/service/network/share/file discovery, local storage enumeration, ingress tool transfer, hidden windows, reflective code loading, file deletion, keylogging indicators, service stops, and data encryption activity. Because several mapped behaviors are also used by administrators and legitimate software, detection should correlate sequences: discovery across services/processes/network/shares/storage followed by tool transfer or suspicious execution, service changes or stops, stealth behaviors, and encryption-like file activity.
Likely telemetry
- Windows endpoint detection and response events for process creation, command line, parent/child process relationships, and module or memory-loading behavior
- PowerShell logging where enabled, including script block, module, and command invocation evidence
- Windows service control and service configuration change events
- Windows Security events relevant to logon context, privilege use, and token-related anomalies
- File system telemetry for high-volume file modification, encryption-like writes, suspicious renames, and file deletion
Detection direction
- Build detections around behavior chains rather than the Cuba name alone, because ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance and the malware uses common administrative interfaces.
- Tune discovery detections for bursts or unusual combinations of service, process, network configuration, network connection, file, directory, share, language, and storage enumeration on Windows systems.
- Correlate PowerShell or cmd execution with subsequent tool transfer, service creation or modification, service stopping, file deletion, and encryption-like file operations.
- Treat Windows service changes and service stop activity on critical servers as high-value ransomware precursors, while suppressing known maintenance windows and approved administrative tooling.
- Account for stealth blind spots: packed binaries, legitimate-looking names or locations, hidden windows, native API usage, and reflective code loading can reduce reliance on simple file names, hashes, or command-line-only rules.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with recovery resilience: tested offline or protected backups, restoration runbooks, and prioritization of critical Windows services and business systems.
- Reduce execution and scripting risk by constraining unnecessary PowerShell and command shell use, applying least privilege, and monitoring administrative tooling rather than blocking blindly.
- Harden Windows service control by limiting who can create, modify, or stop services and by reviewing service configurations on critical hosts.
- Improve identity and privilege controls around administrative accounts because access token manipulation and keylogging-related behaviors increase the value of strong credential hygiene and rapid credential reset procedures.
- Limit ransomware spread opportunities by reviewing network share exposure, SMB access, and segmentation for systems that hold critical operational data.
Analyst notes and limits
This take is based on the ATT&CK S0625 Cuba malware object, its Windows platform designation, the official description, the McAfee April 2021 reference listed by MITRE, and the supplied 'uses' relationships. The mapped relationships provide useful defensive planning context even though the malware object itself does not specify tactics and does not include ATT&CK detection text.
The supplied ATT&CK fields do not provide indicators, hashes, command examples for Cuba specifically, active campaign status, victim counts, attribution, or guaranteed detection logic. Several related technique descriptions list broad platform applicability, but the malware object itself is Windows-based, so environment-specific validation should focus on Windows unless local intelligence supports more. Local telemetry, asset criticality, and incident history are required to turn this into a precise coverage assessment.
Cuba
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 0fb4b28cc17d… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
McAfee Cuba April 2021
Roccio, T., et al. (2021, April). Technical Analysis of Cuba Ransomware. Retrieved June 18, 2021.
Open source URL -
[2]
Cuba
(Citation: McAfee Cuba April 2021)
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[3]
mitre-attack S0625Open source URL
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