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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0622: AppleSeed

AppleSeed is a backdoor that has been used by Kimsuky to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial targets since at least 2021.[1]

EnterpriseS0622MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

AppleSeed matters because ATT&CK describes it as a backdoor used by Kimsuky against government, academic, and commercial targets, with Windows and Android listed as platforms. The relationship set shows behavior beyond simple remote access: discovery, local and removable-media data collection, keylogging, screen capture, web-based command and control, fallback channels, staging, exfiltration over C2, and stealth through obfuscation, packing, masquerading, and file deletion.

Executive priority

Treat AppleSeed as a decision point for resilience and evidence readiness: can the organization prove it would see suspicious endpoint discovery, data collection, credential capture, and web-based C2/exfiltration on Windows and relevant Android assets? Leaders should prioritize telemetry retention, egress visibility, removable-media governance, endpoint hardening, and incident response procedures over relying on a named-malware signature, because ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this object.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate coverage behaviorally against the related techniques: PowerShell and JavaScript execution, process/system/network/file discovery, local and removable-media collection, local staging, keylogging/screen capture indicators, web protocol C2, fallback communications, chunked or threshold-aware transfer patterns, and cleanup/masquerading behaviors. Detection engineering should separate normal administrative discovery and scripting from suspicious chains that combine discovery, collection, staging, and outbound web traffic from unusual processes or locations.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation, command line, parent-child process, and script execution logs, especially PowerShell and JavaScript/JScript activity on Windows
  • File creation, modification, deletion, rename, staging-directory, and packed/obfuscated executable metadata
  • Endpoint discovery signals: process listing, system information, network configuration, time, and file/directory enumeration
  • Removable media connection and file access events where collected
  • Network proxy, firewall, DNS, TLS, and web request metadata for outbound HTTP/S-like command-and-control patterns

Detection direction

  • Do not depend only on AppleSeed-specific indicators; ATT&CK supplies no official detection text, so validate technique-level analytics and investigative pivots.
  • Tune for behavior chains: discovery followed by local staging, collection from local or removable sources, then web-based outbound communication is higher value than any single command.
  • Review false positives from administrators, inventory tools, backup agents, remote support software, and endpoint management platforms that legitimately perform discovery or scripting.
  • Hunt for masquerading and legitimate-looking resource names or locations, especially when paired with unusual network destinations or file deletion after execution.
  • Assess whether web egress monitoring can distinguish normal browser traffic from non-browser processes using web protocols, and whether fallback or alternate channels would be visible.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize endpoint visibility and hardening on Windows and managed Android assets in scope.
  • Restrict and monitor script execution, especially PowerShell and JavaScript/JScript, using least privilege and approved administrative workflows.
  • Control outbound web traffic with proxying, destination reputation/context, and logging sufficient for incident reconstruction.
  • Limit removable media use and monitor permitted media for sensitive data access where business operations allow.
  • Apply least privilege and data access controls to reduce the value of local collection and credential capture.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK relationships make AppleSeed useful for building a defensive validation plan even though the malware object itself has no ATT&CK tactics listed and no official detection text. The strongest defensive value is mapping the related techniques into telemetry, control, and response evidence requirements.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK fields, external references, and relationships. It does not assert current activity, customer exposure, specific indicators, exploit paths, or guaranteed detection. Local asset inventory, logging configuration, mobile management coverage, and business process context are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

AppleSeed

AppleSeed is a backdoor that has been used by Kimsuky to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial targets since at least 2021.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

32 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.007JavaScriptSub-technique

AppleSeed has the ability to use JavaScript to execute PowerShell.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

AppleSeed has the ability to execute its payload via PowerShell.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.002Software PackingSub-technique

AppleSeed has used UPX packers for its payload DLL.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

AppleSeed can identify the IP of a targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

AppleSeed can disguise JavaScript files as PDFs.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

AppleSeed has been distributed to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

AppleSeed can decode its payload prior to execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

AppleSeed can enumerate the current process on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

AppleSeed can gain system level privilege by passing SeDebugPrivilege to the AdjustTokenPrivilege API.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

AppleSeed can use GetKeyState and GetKeyboardState to capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

AppleSeed can collect data on a compromised host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

AppleSeed has the ability to rename its payload to ESTCommon.dll to masquerade as a DLL belonging to ESTsecurity.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

AppleSeed can identify the OS version of a targeted system.[1]

EnterpriseT1119Automated Collection

AppleSeed has automatically collected data from USB drives, keystrokes, and screen images before exfiltration.[2]

EnterpriseT1567Exfiltration Over Web Service

AppleSeed has exfiltrated files using web services.[2]

EnterpriseT1030Data Transfer Size Limits

AppleSeed has divided files if the size is 0x1000000 bytes or more.[2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

AppleSeed has the ability to use multiple dynamically resolved API calls.[1]

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration.[2]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

AppleSeed can use a second channel for C2 when the primary channel is in upload mode.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

AppleSeed has the ability to search for .txt, .ppt, .hwp, .pdf, and .doc files in specified directories.[1]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

AppleSeed has the ability to Base64 encode its payload and custom encrypt API calls.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

AppleSeed has the ability to communicate with C2 over HTTP.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

AppleSeed can delete files from a compromised host after they are exfiltrated.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host by calling a series of APIs.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

AppleSeed can achieve execution through users running malicious file attachments distributed via email.[1]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

AppleSeed can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.[1]

EnterpriseT1560.001Archive via UtilitySub-technique

AppleSeed can zip and encrypt data collected on a target system.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

AppleSeed has the ability to create the Registry key name EstsoftAutoUpdate at HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce to establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1025Data from Removable Media

AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

AppleSeed can pull a timestamp from the victim's machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.010Regsvr32Sub-technique

AppleSeed can call regsvr32.exe for execution.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1059.007: JavaScriptEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.002: Software PackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566.001: Spearphishing AttachmentEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134: Access Token ManipulationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · GroupG0094: KimsukyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1119: Automated CollectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1567: Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1030: Data Transfer Size LimitsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560: Archive Collected DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1008: Fallback ChannelsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d9c650922faace63...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundled9c650922faa…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

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    Open source URL
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    Open source URL
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