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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0600: Doki

Doki is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. Doki was used in conjunction with the ngrok Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms. [1]

EnterpriseS0600MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0600: Doki describes [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600) is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. [Doki](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0600) was used in conjunction with the [ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms. (Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)

Executive priority

S0600: Doki is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0600: Doki by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, Containers), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Cloud control-plane, SaaS audit, and container platform logs
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0600: Doki appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Doki

Doki is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. Doki was used in conjunction with the ngrok Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsSub-technique

Doki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.[1]

EnterpriseT1611Escape to Host

Doki’s container was configured to bind the host root directory.[1]

EnterpriseT1020Automated Exfiltration

Doki has used a script that gathers information from a hardcoded list of IP addresses and uploads to an Ngrok URL.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

Doki has used the embedTLS library for network communications.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Doki has used Ngrok to establish C2 and exfiltrate data.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

Doki has downloaded scripts from C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

Doki has executed shell scripts with /bin/sh.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Doki has resolved the path of a process PID to use as a script argument.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

Doki has communicated with C2 over HTTPS.[1]

EnterpriseT1102Web Service

Doki has used the dogechain.info API to generate a C2 address.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Doki has disguised a file as a Linux kernel module.[1]

EnterpriseT1133External Remote Services

Doki was executed through an open Docker daemon API port.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Doki has searched for the current process’s PID.[1]

EnterpriseT1610Deploy Container

Doki was run through a deployed container.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1568.002: Domain Generation AlgorithmsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1611: Escape to HostEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1020: Automated ExfiltrationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.002: Asymmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.004: Unix ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1102: Web ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1133: External Remote ServicesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1610: Deploy ContainerEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1762f2580c08900d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle1762f2580c08…
19.11.0Older bundle1762f2580c08…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Intezer Doki July 20

    Fishbein, N., Kajiloti, M.. (2020, July 28). Watch Your Containers: Doki Infecting Docker Servers in the Cloud. Retrieved March 30, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0600
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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