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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0549: SilkBean

SilkBean is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.[1]

MobileS0549MalwareObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0549: SilkBean describes [SilkBean](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0549) is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.(Citation: Lookout Uyghur Campaign)

Executive priority

S0549: SilkBean is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0549: SilkBean by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0549: SilkBean appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SilkBean

SilkBean is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

SilkBean can access device contacts.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

SilkBean has hidden malicious functionality in a second stage file and has encrypted C2 server information.[1]

MobileT1632.001Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique

SilkBean has attempted to trick users into enabling installation of applications from unknown sources.[1]

MobileT1582SMS Control

SilkBean can send SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1437.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

SilkBean has used HTTPS for C2 communication.[1]

MobileT1420File and Directory Discovery

SilkBean can get file lists on the SD card.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

SilkBean can access the camera on the device.[1]

MobileT1630.002File DeletionSub-technique

SilkBean can delete various piece of device data, such as contacts, call logs, applications, SMS messages, email, plugins, and files in external storage.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

SilkBean can access SMS messages.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

SilkBean can access call logs.[1]

MobileT1407Download New Code at Runtime

SilkBean can install new applications which are obtained from the C2 server.[1]

MobileT1655.001Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique

SilkBean has been incorporated into trojanized applications, including Uyghur/Arabic focused keyboards, alphabets, and plugins, as well as official-looking Google applications.[1]

MobileT1521.002Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique

SilkBean has used HTTPS for C2 communication.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

SilkBean has access to the device’s location.[1]

MobileT1533Data from Local System

SilkBean can retrieve files from external storage and can collect browser data.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1632.001: Code Signing Policy ModificationMobileuses · TechniqueT1582: SMS ControlMobileuses · TechniqueT1437.001: Web ProtocolsMobileuses · TechniqueT1420: File and Directory DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1630.002: File DeletionMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1407: Download New Code at RuntimeMobileuses · TechniqueT1655.001: Match Legitimate Name or LocationMobileuses · TechniqueT1521.002: Asymmetric CryptographyMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1533: Data from Local SystemMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
dc0a7f61c6812348...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundledc0a7f61c681…
19.11.0Older bundledc0a7f61c681…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lookout Uyghur Campaign

    A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0549
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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