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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0501: PipeMon

PipeMon is a multi-stage modular backdoor used by Winnti Group.[1]

EnterpriseS0501MalwareObject v1.2Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0501: PipeMon describes [PipeMon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0501) is a multi-stage modular backdoor used by [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: ESET PipeMon May 2020)

Executive priority

S0501: PipeMon is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0501: PipeMon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0501: PipeMon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PipeMon

PipeMon is a multi-stage modular backdoor used by Winnti Group.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

23 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1134.002Create Process with TokenSub-technique

PipeMon can attempt to gain administrative privileges using token impersonation.[1]

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

PipeMon can collect and send OS version and computer name as a part of its C2 beacon.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

PipeMon has modified the Registry to store its encrypted payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

PipeMon modules are stored encrypted on disk.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

PipeMon can install additional modules via C2 commands.[1]

EnterpriseT1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique

PipeMon can inject its modules into various processes using reflective DLL loading.[1]

EnterpriseT1547.012Print ProcessorsSub-technique

The PipeMon installer has modified the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors to install PipeMon as a Print Processor.[1]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

The PipeMon communication module can use a custom protocol based on TLS over TCP.[1]

EnterpriseT1548.002Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique

PipeMon installer can use UAC bypass techniques to install the payload.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

PipeMon can iterate over the running processes to find a suitable injection target.[1]

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

PipeMon can send time zone information from a compromised host to C2.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

PipeMon communications are RC4 encrypted.[1]

EnterpriseT1134.004Parent PID SpoofingSub-technique

PipeMon can use parent PID spoofing to elevate privileges.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

PipeMon can decrypt password-protected executables.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

PipeMon's first stage has been executed by a call to CreateProcess with the decryption password in an argument. PipeMon has used a call to LoadLibrary to load its installer.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.011Fileless StorageSub-technique

PipeMon has stored its encrypted payload in the Registry under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Print\Components\`.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

PipeMon can establish persistence by registering a malicious DLL as an alternative Print Processor which is loaded when the print spooler service starts.[1]

EnterpriseT1553.002Code SigningSub-technique

PipeMon, its installer, and tools are signed with stolen code-signing certificates.[1]

EnterpriseT1008Fallback Channels

PipeMon can switch to an alternate C2 domain when a particular date has been reached.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

PipeMon modules are stored on disk with seemingly benign names including use of a file extension associated with a popular word processor.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

PipeMon can collect and send the local IP address, RDP information, and the network adapter physical address as a part of its C2 beacon.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

PipeMon can check for the presence of ESET and Kaspersky security software.[1]

EnterpriseT1129Shared Modules

PipeMon has used call to LoadLibrary to load its installer. PipeMon loads its modules using reflective loading or custom shellcode.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
bb2e04cf330d7002...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.2Current bundlebb2e04cf330d…
19.21.2Older bundlebb2e04cf330d…
19.11.2Older bundlebb2e04cf330d…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ESET PipeMon May 2020

    Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS0501
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.