LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0435: PLEAD

PLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.[1][2] PLEAD has also been referred to as TSCookie, though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. PLEAD was observed in use as early as March 2017.[3][2]

EnterpriseS0435MalwareObject v2.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

PLEAD is a Windows remote access tool and downloader documented by ATT&CK as used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia, including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong. Its practical significance is not just the malware name: the mapped behaviors combine user-driven execution, discovery, credential access, tool transfer, command-and-control over web protocols, proxying, encryption, junk data, and file deletion. That mix can challenge organizations that rely only on basic endpoint alerts or perimeter web filtering.

Executive priority

Treat PLEAD as a validation case for whether Windows endpoint, web, identity, and incident response controls can withstand a targeted RAT/downloader workflow. Leaders should ask whether the organization can prove coverage for malicious links/files, suspicious command shell and native API execution, credential access from browser/password stores, unusual outbound web/proxy traffic, and post-activity cleanup. This is especially relevant for resilience planning, audit evidence, and incident decision-making where targeted intrusion scenarios are in scope.

Technical view

For SOC and detection engineering teams, coverage should be assessed across the mapped ATT&CK relationships rather than only against a malware signature. Validate visibility for Windows execution via command shell and native API behavior, discovery of processes/windows/files, credential access involving browser or password store artifacts, downloaded tools/files, file deletion, and C2 patterns using web protocols, proxying, symmetric encryption, and junk data. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this malware object, local analytic quality depends on correlating endpoint activity with network and identity evidence.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry
  • Parent-child process relationships involving command shell execution
  • File creation, download, modification, and deletion events
  • Browser credential store and password store access indicators where defensible and privacy-approved
  • Process, window, file, and directory enumeration activity

Detection direction

  • Do not depend on a PLEAD-specific signature alone; test behavior-based analytics for the related techniques.
  • Correlate user-driven execution events with follow-on discovery, file transfer, credential access, and outbound web/proxy communications.
  • Tune command shell detections to account for legitimate administrative activity while retaining suspicious context such as unusual parent processes, rare destinations, or execution from user-writable paths.
  • Review whether encrypted or padded web traffic could bypass simplistic content inspection; focus on metadata, destination patterns, proxy behavior, and endpoint correlation.
  • Validate that file deletion events are retained long enough to support incident reconstruction.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize hardened user-execution controls for malicious links and files, including attachment/link handling and user-risk reduction programs.
  • Strengthen Windows endpoint monitoring and response for command shell execution, discovery activity, file transfer, credential-store access, and cleanup behavior.
  • Limit credential exposure by reducing saved browser credentials where appropriate and enforcing least privilege and strong identity controls.
  • Constrain outbound traffic through managed egress paths and review proxy/web logging retention and inspection policy.
  • Prepare incident response playbooks that collect endpoint, web/proxy, DNS, and identity evidence together for RAT/downloader investigations.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies PLEAD as a Windows RAT and downloader associated with BlackTech reporting and provides relationship mappings to multiple ATT&CK techniques. The most useful defensive value comes from testing coverage across those relationships: execution, discovery, credential access, command-and-control, ingress tool transfer, proxy use, encryption, junk data, and file deletion.

ATT&CK does not provide official detection guidance for this malware object, and the supplied fields do not include indicators, hashes, infrastructure, specific procedures, or guaranteed detection logic. Local risk depends on the organization’s Windows estate, exposure to relevant targeting, telemetry retention, endpoint controls, web/proxy architecture, and identity practices.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PLEAD

PLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.[1][2] PLEAD has also been referred to as TSCookie, though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. PLEAD was observed in use as early as March 2017.[3][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

15 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

PLEAD has used HTTP for communications with command and control (C2) servers.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

PLEAD has the ability to execute shell commands on the compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1555Credentials from Password Stores

PLEAD has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.[6]

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

PLEAD has the ability to proxy network communications.[2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

PLEAD has been executed via malicious e-mail attachments.[1]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

PLEAD has the ability to list drives and files on the compromised host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1001.001Junk DataSub-technique

PLEAD samples were found to be highly obfuscated with junk code.[6][1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

PLEAD has the ability to upload and download files to and from an infected host.[2]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

PLEAD has the ability to delete files on the compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

PLEAD has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

PLEAD can use `ShellExecute` to execute applications.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

PLEAD has the ability to list processes on the compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1010Application Window Discovery

PLEAD has the ability to list open windows on the compromised host.[1][1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

PLEAD has used RC4 encryption to download modules.[2]

EnterpriseT1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique

PLEAD can harvest saved credentials from browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Mozilla Firefox.[1][6]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0098: BlackTech

BlackTech is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. BlackTech has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0098: BlackTechEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555: Credentials from Password StoresEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1090: ProxyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.001: Junk DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.001: Malicious LinkEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1010: Application Window DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1555.003: Credentials from Web BrowsersEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
46a72f744758a120...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.12.0Current bundle46a72f744758…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    JPCert TSCookie March 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Trend Micro Waterbear December 2019

    Su, V. et al. (2019, December 11). Waterbear Returns, Uses API Hooking to Evade Security. Retrieved February 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020

    Threat Intelligence. (2020, September 29). Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors. Retrieved March 25, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018

    Cherepanov, A.. (2018, July 9). Certificates stolen from Taiwanese tech‑companies misused in Plead malware campaign. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    JPCert TSCookie March 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    JPCert TSCookie March 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    PLEAD

    PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

  12. [12]
    PLEAD

    PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

  13. [13]
    PLEAD

    PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)

  14. [14]
    Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO

    Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO

    Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO

    Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    mitre-attackS0435
    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    mitre-attackS0435
    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    mitre-attackS0435
    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020

    Threat Intelligence. (2020, September 29). Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors. Retrieved March 25, 2022.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Trend Micro Waterbear December 2019

    Su, V. et al. (2019, December 11). Waterbear Returns, Uses API Hooking to Evade Security. Retrieved February 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018

    Cherepanov, A.. (2018, July 9). Certificates stolen from Taiwanese tech‑companies misused in Plead malware campaign. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018

    Cherepanov, A.. (2018, July 9). Certificates stolen from Taiwanese tech‑companies misused in Plead malware campaign. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018

    Cherepanov, A.. (2018, July 9). Certificates stolen from Taiwanese tech‑companies misused in Plead malware campaign. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018

    Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    ESET PLEAD Malware July 2018

    Cherepanov, A.. (2018, July 9). Certificates stolen from Taiwanese tech‑companies misused in Plead malware campaign. Retrieved May 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use