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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0098: BlackTech

BlackTech is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. BlackTech has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0098GroupObject v2.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0098: BlackTech describes [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symante...

Executive priority

G0098: BlackTech is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0098: BlackTech by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0098: BlackTech appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

BlackTech

BlackTech is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. BlackTech has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1566.002Spearphishing LinkSub-technique

BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with links to cloud services to deliver malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1204.001Malicious LinkSub-technique

BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.[1]

EnterpriseT1588.003Code Signing CertificatesSub-technique

BlackTech has used stolen code-signing certificates for its malicious payloads.[2]

EnterpriseT1046Network Service Discovery

BlackTech has used the SNScan tool to find other potential targets on victim networks.[2]

EnterpriseT1588.002ToolSub-technique

BlackTech has obtained and used tools such as Putty, SNScan, and PsExec for its operations.[2]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

BlackTech has exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0, CVE-2017-7269, in order to establish a new HTTP or command and control (C2) server.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.004SSHSub-technique

BlackTech has used Putty for remote access.[2]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

BlackTech has used built-in API functions.[4]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

BlackTech has exploited multiple vulnerabilities for execution, including Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-6352, CVE-2017-0199, and Adobe Flash CVE-2015-5119.[1]

EnterpriseT1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique

BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious password-protected archived files (ZIP or RAR) to deliver malware.[1]CitationNTT Security Flagpro new December 2021

EnterpriseT1036.002Right-to-Left OverrideSub-technique

BlackTech has used right-to-left-override to obfuscate the filenames of malicious e-mail attachments.[1]

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories.CitationTrend Micro Waterbear December 2019

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious documents to lure victims into installing malware.[1]CitationNTT Security Flagpro new December 2021

EnterpriseT1588.004Digital CertificatesSub-technique

BlackTech has used valid, stolen digital certificates for some of their malware and tools.CitationESET PLEAD Malware July 2018

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0435: PLEAD

PLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.[1][2] PLEAD has also been referred to as TSCookie, though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. PLEAD was observed in use as early as March 2017.[3][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0029: PsExec

PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0696: Flagpro

Flagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0579: Waterbear

Waterbear is modular malware attributed to BlackTech that has been used primarily for lateral movement, decrypting, and triggering payloads and is capable of hiding network behaviors.[1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
875364c1da4db469...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundle875364c1da4d…
19.12.0Older bundle18585c51b455…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017

    Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020

    Threat Intelligence. (2020, September 29). Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors. Retrieved March 25, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020

    Lee, Y. (2020, August 19). Taiwan says China behind cyberattacks on government agencies, emails. Retrieved April 6, 2022.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021

    Demboski, M., et al. (2021, October 26). China cyber attacks: the current threat landscape. Retrieved March 25, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Palmerworm

    (Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021)

  6. [6]
    mitre-attackG0098
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.