S0436: TSCookie
Security context for executives and security teams
S0436: TSCookie describes [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in campaigns against Japanese targets.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019). [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436) has been referred to as [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) though more recent reporting indicates a separation between the two.(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 201...
Executive priority
S0436: TSCookie is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0436: TSCookie by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0436: TSCookie appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
TSCookie
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0098: BlackTech
BlackTech is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. BlackTech has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d9137fbf4b04… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d9137fbf4b04… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d9137fbf4b04… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]JPCert TSCookie March 2018
Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019
Tomonaga, S.. (2019, September 18). Malware Used by BlackTech after Network Intrusion. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018
Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0436Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.