S0176: Wingbird
Security context for executives and security teams
S0176: Wingbird describes [Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176) is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software [FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182). It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) in a May 2016 campaign. (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016)
Executive priority
S0176: Wingbird is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0176: Wingbird by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0176: Wingbird appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Wingbird
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1547.008 | LSASS DriverSub-technique | Wingbird drops a malicious file (sspisrv.dll) alongside a copy of lsass.exe, which is used to register a service that loads sspisrv.dll as a driver. The payload of the malicious driver (located in its entry-point function) is executed when loaded by lsass.exe before the spoofed service becomes unstable and crashes.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service ExecutionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0055: NEODYMIUM
NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. [1] [2] NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. [3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | cf81708e30b4… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | cf81708e30b4… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft SIR Vol 21
Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
- [2]Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016
Microsoft. (2016, December 14). Twin zero-day attacks: PROMETHIUM and NEODYMIUM target individuals in Europe. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
Open source URL - [3]Microsoft Wingbird Nov 2017
Microsoft. (2017, November 9). Backdoor:Win32/Wingbird.A!dha. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
Open source URL - [4]Wingbird
(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft Wingbird Nov 2017)
- [5]mitre-attackS0176Open source URL
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