S0140: Shamoon

S0140: Shamoon describes [Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140) is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the "Cutting Sword of Justice" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. [Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140) has also been seen leveraging [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. Analysis has linked [Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140) with [Kwampirs](https://attack.mitr...

Executive priority

S0140: Shamoon is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0140: Shamoon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0140: Shamoon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Shamoon

Shamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the "Cutting Sword of Justice" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. Analysis has linked Shamoon with Kwampirs based on multiple shared artifacts and coding patterns.[1] The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.[2][3][4][5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques24 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1124	System Time Discovery	Shamoon obtains the system time and will only activate if it is greater than a preset date.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1561.002	Disk Structure WipeSub-technique	Shamoon has been seen overwriting features of disk structure such as the MBR.[4][5][2][3]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Shamoon obtains the victim's operating system version and keyboard layout and sends the information to the C2 server.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1012	Query Registry	Shamoon queries several Registry keys to identify hard disk partitions to overwrite.[2]
Enterprise	T1021.002	SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique	Shamoon accesses network share(s), enables share access to the target device, copies an executable payload to the target system, and uses a Scheduled Task/Job to execute the malware.[5]
Enterprise	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique	Shamoon creates a new service named “ntssrv” that attempts to appear legitimate; the service's display name is “Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service” and its description is “Helps guard against time change attempts targeting known and newly discovered vulnerabilities in network time protocols.” Newer versions create the "MaintenaceSrv" service, which misspells the word "maintenance."[2]CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1105	Ingress Tool Transfer	Shamoon can download an executable to run on the victim.[2]
Enterprise	T1485	Data Destruction	Shamoon attempts to overwrite operating system files and disk structures with image files.[4][5][2] In a later variant, randomly generated data was used for data overwrites.[3]CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	Shamoon creates a new service named “ntssrv” to execute the payload. Newer versions create the "MaintenaceSrv" and "hdv_725x" services.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Shamoon obtains the target's IP address and local network segment.[2]CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	Shamoon contains base64-encoded strings.[2]
Enterprise	T1078.002	Domain AccountsSub-technique	If Shamoon cannot access shares using current privileges, it attempts access using hard coded, domain-specific credentials gathered earlier in the intrusion.[5][3]
Enterprise	T1569.002	Service ExecutionSub-technique	Shamoon creates a new service named “ntssrv” to execute the payload. Shamoon can also spread via PsExec.[2]CitationMcAfee Shamoon December19 2018
Enterprise	T1134.001	Token Impersonation/TheftSub-technique	Shamoon can impersonate tokens using `LogonUser`, `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser`, and `ImpersonateNamedPipeClient`.CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1570	Lateral Tool Transfer	Shamoon attempts to copy itself to remote machines on the network.[2]
Enterprise	T1053.005	Scheduled TaskSub-technique	Shamoon copies an executable payload to the target system by using SMB/Windows Admin Shares and then scheduling an unnamed task to execute the malware.[5][2]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Shamoon decrypts ciphertext using an XOR cipher and a base64-encoded string.[3]
Enterprise	T1112	Modify Registry	Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting `SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy` to 1.[5][2]CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1548.002	Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique	Shamoon attempts to disable UAC remote restrictions by modifying the Registry.[2]
Enterprise	T1529	System Shutdown/Reboot	Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed.[3]CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1486	Data Encrypted for Impact	Shamoon has an operational mode for encrypting data instead of overwriting it.[2][3]
Enterprise	T1018	Remote System Discovery	Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim's interfaces.[5]
Enterprise	T1070.006	TimestompSub-technique	Shamoon can change the modified time for files to evade forensic detection.CitationMcAfee Shamoon December 2018
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Shamoon has used HTTP for C2.[2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 2.2
Created: May 31, 2017, 21:33 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Nov 17, 2024, 16:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 36c912778ed1c67a...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.2	Nov 17, 2024, 16:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`36c912778ed1…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.2	Nov 17, 2024, 16:07 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`36c912778ed1…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Cylera Kwampirs 2022
Pablo Rincón Crespo. (2022, January). The link between Kwampirs (Orangeworm) and Shamoon APTs. Retrieved February 8, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016
Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
[3]
Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018
Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
Open source URL
[4]
Symantec Shamoon 2012
Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.
Open source URL
[5]
FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016
FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL
[6]
Disttrack
(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)
[7]
mitre-attackS0140
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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