G1014: LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
G1014: LuminousMoth describes [LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. [LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between [LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) and [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/gr...
Executive priority
G1014: LuminousMoth is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G1014: LuminousMoth by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G1014: LuminousMoth appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | LuminousMoth has used an unnamed post-exploitation tool to steal cookies from the Chrome browser.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | LuminousMoth has exfiltrated data to Google Drive.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | LuminousMoth has sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious Dropbox download link.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.001 | MalwareSub-technique | LuminousMoth has obtained and used malware such as Cobalt Strike.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits | LuminousMoth has split archived files into multiple parts to bypass a 5MB limit.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1608.001 | Upload MalwareSub-technique | LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs to spread malware to connected removable USB drives on infected machines.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | LuminousMoth has used malware that exfiltrates stolen data to its C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1608.004 | Drive-by TargetSub-technique | LuminousMoth has redirected compromised machines to an actor-controlled webpage through HTML injection.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1608.005 | Link TargetSub-technique | LuminousMoth has created a link to a Dropbox file that has been used in their spear-phishing operations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1587.001 | MalwareSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used unique malware for information theft and exfiltration.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used HTTP for C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | LuminousMoth has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1557.002 | ARP Cache PoisoningSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used ARP spoofing to redirect a compromised machine to an actor-controlled website.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | LuminousMoth has obtained an ARP spoofing tool from GitHub.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | LuminousMoth has collected files and data from compromised machines.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | LuminousMoth has lured victims into clicking malicious Dropbox download links delivered through spearphishing.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as `winword.exe` and `igfxem.exe` to side-load their malware.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run`.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | LuminousMoth has used malware that scans for files in the Documents, Desktop, and Download folders and in other drives.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | LuminousMoth has used a malicious DLL to collect the username from compromised hosts.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1560 | Archive Collected Data | LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | LuminousMoth has disguised their exfiltration malware as `ZoomVideoApp.exe`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | LuminousMoth has used malware that adds Registry keys for persistence.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | LuminousMoth has created scheduled tasks to establish persistence for their tools.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1588.004 | Digital CertificatesSub-technique | LuminousMoth has used a valid digital certificate for some of their malware.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | LuminousMoth has signed their malware with a valid digital signature.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0013: PlugX
S0154: Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]
In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 4e8d5d8bdecd… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 1d14c20bca59… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Kaspersky LuminousMoth July 2021
Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021
Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackG1014Open source URL
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