C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration
The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration describes The [Salesforce Data Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0059) campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using [Spearphishing Voice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598/004) (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure...
Executive priority
C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration is an official MITRE ATT&CK campaign. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Salesforce Data Exfiltration
The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1684.001 | ImpersonationSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors impersonated IT support personnel in voice calls with victims at times claiming to be addressing enterprise-wide connectivity issues.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1608.005 | Link TargetSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors established an Okta phishing panel which victims were tricked into accessing from mobile phones or work computers during social engineering calls.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.006 | PythonSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used custom applications developed in python.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1213.004 | Customer Relationship Management SoftwareSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors accessed and exfiltrated sensitive information from compromised Salesforce instances.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1671 | Cloud Application Integration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors deceived victims into authorizing malicious connected apps to their organization's Salesforce portal.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1078.002 | Domain AccountsSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised credentials for lateral movement.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors exfiltrated data via legitimate Salesforce API communication channels including the Salesforce Data Loader application.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1036 | Masquerading | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Mullvad VPN IPs to proxy voice phishing calls.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1585.002 | Email AccountsSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors registered emails shinycorp@tuta[.]com and shinygroup@tuta[.]com to send victims extortion demands.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors queried customers' Salesforce environments to identify sensitive information for exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1090.003 | Multi-hop ProxySub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Tor IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1585 | Establish Accounts | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created Salesforce trial accounts to register their malicious applications.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1587.001 | MalwareSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created malicious applications within Salesforce trial accounts, typically Python scripts with similar function to the Salesforce Data Loader.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initially relied on the legitimate Salesforce Data Loader app for data exfiltration.[2][1] |
| Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used API queries to automatically exfiltrate large volumes of data.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1586.002 | Email AccountsSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised emails to create Salesforce trial accounts.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1598.004 | Spearphishing VoiceSub-technique | During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initiated voice calls with victims to socially engineer them into authorizing malicious applications or divulging sensitive credentials.[1][2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0183: Tor
Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes "Onion Routing," in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination. [1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b2b2739cafc2… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | ee83c93e765e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]FBI Salesforce Data Theft SEP 2025
FBI Cyber Division. (2025, September 12). Cyber Criminal Groups UNC6040 and UNC6395 Compromising Salesforce Instances for Data Theft and Extortion. Retrieved October 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]Google Salesforce JUN 2025
Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2025, June 4). The Cost of a Call: From Voice Phishing to Data Extortion. Retrieved October 22, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackC0059Open source URL
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