T1671: Cloud Application Integration
Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging OAuth application integrations in a software-as-a-service environment. Adversaries may create a custom application, add a legitimate application into the environment, or even co-opt an existing integration to achieve malicious ends.[1][2]
OAuth is an open standard that allows users to authorize applications to access their information on their behalf. In a SaaS environment such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, users may integrate applications to improve their workflow and achieve tasks.
Leveraging application integrations may allow adversaries to persist in an environment – for example, by granting consent to an application from a high-privileged adversary-controlled account in order to maintain access to its data, even in the event of losing access to the account.[3][4][5] In some cases, integrations may remain valid even after the original consenting user account is disabled.[6] Application integrations may also allow adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication requirements through the use of Application Access Tokens. Finally, they may enable persistent Automated Exfiltration over time.[7]
Creating or adding a new application may require the adversary to create a dedicated Cloud Account for the application and assign it Additional Cloud Roles – for example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an application can only access resources via an associated service principal.[8]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1671: Cloud Application Integration describes Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging OAuth application integrations in a software-as-a-service environment. Adversaries may create a custom application, add a legitimate application into the environment, or even co-opt an existing integration to achieve malicious ends.(Citation: Push Security SaaS Persistence 2022)(Citation: SaaS Attacks GitHub Evil Twin Integrations) OAuth is an open standard that allows users to authorize applications to access their information on their behalf. In a SaaS environment...
Executive priority
T1671: Cloud Application Integration is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1671: Cloud Application Integration by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence), supported platforms (Office Suite, SaaS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1671: Cloud Application Integration appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Cloud Application Integration
Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging OAuth application integrations in a software-as-a-service environment. Adversaries may create a custom application, add a legitimate application into the environment, or even co-opt an existing integration to achieve malicious ends.[1][2]
OAuth is an open standard that allows users to authorize applications to access their information on their behalf. In a SaaS environment such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, users may integrate applications to improve their workflow and achieve tasks.
Leveraging application integrations may allow adversaries to persist in an environment – for example, by granting consent to an application from a high-privileged adversary-controlled account in order to maintain access to its data, even in the event of losing access to the account.[3][4][5] In some cases, integrations may remain valid even after the original consenting user account is disabled.[6] Application integrations may also allow adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication requirements through the use of Application Access Tokens. Finally, they may enable persistent Automated Exfiltration over time.[7]
Creating or adding a new application may require the adversary to create a dedicated Cloud Account for the application and assign it Additional Cloud Roles – for example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an application can only access resources via an associated service principal.[8]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration
The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.[1][2]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 95db254ac058… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 95db254ac058… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 95db254ac058… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Push Security SaaS Persistence 2022
Luke Jennings. (2022, November 29). Maintaining persistent access in a SaaS-first world. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [2]SaaS Attacks GitHub Evil Twin Integrations
Push Security. (n.d.). Evil twin integrations. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [3]Wiz Midnight Blizzard 2024
Lior Sonntag. (2024, February 8). Midnight Blizzard attack on Microsoft corporate environment: a detailed analysis, detections and recommendations. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]Microsoft Malicious OAuth Applications 2022
Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, September 22). Malicious OAuth applications abuse cloud email services to spread spam. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [5]Huntress Persistence Microsoft 365 Compromise 2024
Sharon Martin. (2024, November 5). Legitimate Apps as Traitorware for Persistent Microsoft 365 Compromise. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [6]Push Security Slack Persistence 2023
Luke Jennings. (2023, October 24). Slack Attack: A phisher's guide to persistence and lateral movement. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [7]Synes Cyber Corner Malicious Azure Application 2023
syne0. (2023, July 10). Malicious Azure Application PERFECTDATA SOFTWARE and Microsoft 365 Business Email Compromise. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
Open source URL - [8]Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals
Microsoft. (2023, December 15). Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
Open source URL - [9]mitre-attackT1671Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.