S1042: SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1042: SUGARDUMP describes [SUGARDUMP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1042) is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the [C0010](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0010) campaign. The first known [SUGARDUMP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1042) version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022)
Executive priority
S1042: SUGARDUMP is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1042: SUGARDUMP by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1042: SUGARDUMP appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1555.003 | Credentials from Web BrowsersSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1217 | Browser Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.003 | Mail ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0010: C0010
C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 9ba1c8ad8c26… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 9ba1c8ad8c26… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022
Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1042Open source URL
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