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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0021: Molerats

Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[1][2][3][4]

EnterpriseG0021GroupObject v2.1 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Molerats is an ATT&CK-tracked intrusion set described by MITRE as an Arabic-speaking, politically motivated group operating since 2012, with reported victim geography primarily in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. For defenders, the value of this object is less about a single signature and more about validating resilience against a recurring pattern: spearphishing-led access, user-assisted execution, Windows backdoors/RATs, persistence through scheduled tasks or Run keys, script execution, tool transfer, and credential theft from browsers.

Executive priority

Treat this as a practical test case for phishing resilience, endpoint visibility, and incident response readiness. Leaders should ask whether the organization can produce evidence that email security, endpoint logging, script controls, persistence monitoring, and credential protection would expose the ATT&CK behaviors associated with this group. Because the official ATT&CK group object has no detection text and no top-level platform list, prioritization should be based on local exposure: geographic relevance, politically sensitive business functions, executive or regional targeting risk, and the presence of Windows-heavy user endpoints where the related malware and techniques are most represented.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should map coverage against the relationship set rather than relying on a Molerats-specific detection. The relationships include use of PoisonIvy, DustySky, Spark, SharpStage, DropBook, and MoleNet, all listed with Windows platforms, plus techniques spanning spearphishing links and attachments, malicious link/file execution, PowerShell, Visual Basic, JavaScript, msiexec proxy execution, scheduled tasks, Registry Run keys/startup folders, process discovery, ingress tool transfer, deobfuscation/decoding, compression, code signing abuse, and browser credential access. Validate whether detections correlate email events, user execution, child processes from Office/browser/script hosts, persistence writes, scheduled task creation, unusual msiexec activity, downloaded payloads, and browser credential store access into an investigation timeline.

Likely telemetry

  • Email security logs for spearphishing attachments and links, including sender, recipient, URL, attachment, and delivery disposition metadata.
  • Endpoint process creation telemetry for PowerShell, Visual Basic/JScript script hosts, msiexec.exe, archive/decompression utilities, and suspicious child processes from Office applications or browsers.
  • Windows scheduled task creation/modification events and command-line details where available.
  • Windows Registry and startup folder monitoring for Run key or startup persistence changes.
  • File creation and download telemetry for transferred tools, compressed files, decoded payloads, PyInstaller/.NET artifacts where observable, and signed binaries with unusual context.

Detection direction

  • Build behavior-led analytics around the ATT&CK relationships rather than a single group label; the official object does not provide detection guidance.
  • Tune phishing detections to connect initial email delivery with endpoint execution from attachments or links, especially when followed by script interpreters, msiexec, downloads, or persistence creation.
  • Validate command-line and parent/child-process visibility for PowerShell, Visual Basic/JScript, msiexec.exe, and archive/decode activity; lack of command-line logging is a material blind spot.
  • Monitor scheduled task and Run key creation in user context, but account for legitimate software installers and administrative tools to reduce false positives.
  • Review code-signing trust logic: a signed binary should not be treated as benign without execution context, source path, signer reputation, and behavior.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize phishing controls and user-reporting workflows for attachments and links, since both spearphishing attachment and spearphishing link are associated techniques.
  • Harden endpoint execution paths: restrict or monitor script interpreters, PowerShell, and msiexec usage according to business need, with emphasis on high-risk users and regions.
  • Strengthen persistence prevention and monitoring for scheduled tasks, Registry Run keys, and startup folders on Windows endpoints.
  • Reduce credential exposure by managing browser password storage risk, enforcing strong identity controls, and ensuring rapid credential reset procedures during IR.
  • Ensure EDR, email, proxy/DNS, and identity logs are retained long enough to reconstruct the sequence from email delivery to execution, persistence, tool transfer, and credential access.
Analyst notes and limits

The ATT&CK object identifies Molerats aliases as Molerats, Operation Molerats, and Gaza Cybergang, and cites reporting from ClearSky, FireEye, Kaspersky, and Cybereason. Relationship context is especially useful here because the group object has no official detection field and no top-level tactics or platforms. The strongest defensible defensive takeaway is to assess coverage for the related techniques and Windows malware relationships, while keeping geographic and political targeting context as a risk-prioritization input rather than proof of exposure.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK STIX fields, external references, and relationships. It does not assert current activity, customer targeting, confirmed compromise, or guaranteed detection. Top-level platforms and tactics are not specified for the intrusion-set object; platform references come only from related software and technique objects. Local environment telemetry, asset exposure, business geography, and control configuration are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Molerats

Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.[1][2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1218.007 Msiexec Sub-technique

Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020
Enterprise T1204.001 Malicious Link Sub-technique

Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Molerats used executables to download malicious files from different sources.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020
Enterprise T1553.002 Code Signing Sub-technique

Molerats has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.CitationFireEye Operation Molerats
Enterprise T1027.015 Compression Sub-technique

Molerats has delivered compressed executables within ZIP files to victims.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019
Enterprise T1053.005 Scheduled Task Sub-technique

Molerats has created scheduled tasks to persistently run VBScripts.CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020
Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020CitationCybereason Molerats Dec 2020
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

Molerats actors obtained a list of active processes on the victim and sent them to C2 servers.CitationDustySky
Enterprise T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious links included.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019
Enterprise T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique

Molerats used the public tool BrowserPasswordDump10 to dump passwords saved in browsers on victims.CitationDustySky
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019
Enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell Sub-technique

Molerats used PowerShell implants on target machines.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019
Enterprise T1059.005 Visual Basic Sub-technique

Molerats used various implants, including those built with VBScript, on target machines.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020
Enterprise T1059.007 JavaScript Sub-technique

Molerats used various implants, including those built with JS, on target machines.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019
Enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File Sub-technique

Molerats has sent malicious files via email that tricked users into clicking Enable Content to run an embedded macro and to download malicious archives.CitationKaspersky MoleRATs April 2019CitationUnit42 Molerat Mar 2020CitationCybereason Molerats Dec 2020
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Enterprise

S0553: MoleNet

MoleNet is a downloader tool with backdoor capabilities that has been observed in use since at least 2019.[1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S0553: MoleNet Enterprise uses · Technique T1218.007: Msiexec Enterprise uses · Malware S0543: Spark Enterprise uses · Technique T1204.001: Malicious Link Enterprise uses · Technique T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer Enterprise uses · Technique T1553.002: Code Signing Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.015: Compression Enterprise uses · Malware S0062: DustySky Enterprise uses · Technique T1053.005: Scheduled Task Enterprise uses · Malware S0547: DropBook Enterprise uses · Technique T1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.002: Spearphishing Link Enterprise uses · Malware S0546: SharpStage Enterprise uses · Technique T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers Enterprise uses · Technique T1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.001: PowerShell Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.005: Visual Basic Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.007: JavaScript Enterprise uses · Technique T1204.002: Malicious File Enterprise uses · Malware S0012: PoisonIvy Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
096dac19e8b287c3...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.1 Current bundle 096dac19e8b2…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    DustySky

    ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    DustySky2

    ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky - Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019

    GReAT. (2019, April 10). Gaza Cybergang Group1, operation SneakyPastes. Retrieved May 13, 2020.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020

    Cybereason Nocturnus Team. (2020, December 9). MOLERATS IN THE CLOUD: New Malware Arsenal Abuses Cloud Platforms in Middle East Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 22, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    FireEye Operation Molerats

    Villeneuve, N., Haq, H., Moran, N. (2013, August 23). OPERATION MOLERATS: MIDDLE EAST CYBER ATTACKS USING POISON IVY. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Gaza Cybergang

    (Citation: DustySky)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  7. [7]
    Molerats

    (Citation: DustySky)

  8. [8]
    Operation Molerats

    (Citation: FireEye Operation Molerats)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

  9. [9]
    mitre-attack G0021
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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