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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1146: MgBot

MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS1146MalwareObject v1.0 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

MgBot matters because MITRE describes it as a long-running, modular Windows malware framework associated with Daggerfly operations and plugins for credential access, discovery, and collection behaviors. For leaders, the practical issue is not a single signature: a modular tool can present as multiple behaviors across identity, endpoint, and data-access controls, so readiness depends on whether the organization can see and contain credential theft, internal reconnaissance, and sensitive data collection on Windows endpoints.

Executive priority

Prioritize MgBot as an incident-readiness and control-validation use case for Windows environments. The related ATT&CK behaviors touch credential dumping, browser/password-store theft, account and domain discovery, network/service discovery, removable media, clipboard, audio, local data, and database collection. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can prove visibility into those behavior classes, whether identity controls can limit damage if credentials or cookies are stolen, and whether audit evidence shows monitoring for sensitive data access rather than only malware-name detections.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for MgBot, so defenders should validate coverage behaviorally against the linked techniques: T1003, T1056.001, T1539, T1555, T1555.003 for credential access; T1018, T1033, T1046, T1057, T1087.001, T1087.002, T1482 for discovery; and T1005, T1025, T1115, T1123, T1213.006 for collection. In a Windows-focused scope, SOC teams should correlate endpoint events showing credential-store access, browser credential or cookie access, unusual user/domain/network enumeration, and collection from local files, removable media, clipboard, audio devices, or databases. Treat any detection based only on malware family name as incomplete because the supplied object emphasizes a modular plugin design.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint detection and response events for process execution, process access, file access, and suspicious child-process activity
  • Authentication and identity logs that can show account use after possible credential or session theft
  • Directory and domain query logs for local account, domain account, and domain trust discovery
  • Network telemetry for remote system and network service discovery from endpoints
  • Browser and password-store access evidence, where legally and technically collectable

Detection direction

  • Use behavior-based detections mapped to the related techniques rather than relying on an MgBot label or hash alone.
  • Correlate credential-access signals with discovery and collection activity; the combination is more decision-useful than any single noisy event.
  • Validate visibility specifically on Windows endpoints, since Windows is the supplied platform for this malware object.
  • Tune expected administrative enumeration separately from suspicious enumeration by unusual users, hosts, timing, or process context.
  • Check blind spots around browser credential stores, session cookies, clipboard data, removable media, audio capture, and database access; these are often less consistently logged than process creation.

Mitigation priorities

  • Reduce credential value first: enforce least privilege, restrict administrative rights, and strengthen identity controls so credential dumping or browser/password-store theft has limited blast radius.
  • Harden and monitor Windows endpoints for credential-store access, suspicious discovery, and sensitive data collection behaviors.
  • Limit unnecessary access to local sensitive files, removable media, databases, and collaboration or browser-stored credentials based on business need.
  • Improve segmentation and access governance so remote system discovery and service discovery do not translate easily into lateral movement opportunities.
  • Prepare IR procedures for modular malware cases: isolate affected Windows hosts, preserve endpoint and identity evidence, rotate exposed credentials or sessions when supported by findings, and review discovered/collected data scope.
Analyst notes and limits

The strongest decision value is to treat MgBot as a coverage test for the behaviors its plugins are reported by ATT&CK relationships to use. The object is tied to Daggerfly in the official description, but this take does not infer local exposure, active exploitation, or guaranteed detection. The related technique set points to identity compromise and data collection risk, making it relevant to managed detection, incident response, IAM, data protection, and audit readiness.

The supplied ATT&CK object has no official detection section, no aliases, no tactics listed on the malware object itself, and only Windows as the platform. Relationship descriptions include broader platform coverage for the techniques, but this summary does not expand MgBot platform scope beyond the supplied malware platform. Local telemetry, asset criticality, and observed indicators are required to assess exposure or detection quality.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

MgBot

MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

17 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1056.001 Keylogging Sub-technique

MgBot includes keylogger payloads focused on the QQ chat application.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

MgBot includes modules for identifying local users and administrators on victim machines.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1087.002 Domain Account Sub-technique

MgBot includes modules for collecting information on Active Directory domain accounts.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1003 OS Credential Dumping

MgBot includes modules for dumping and capturing credentials from process memory.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

MgBot includes modules for stealing stored credentials from Outlook and Foxmail email client software.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1087.001 Local Account Sub-technique

MgBot includes modules for identifying local administrator accounts on victim systems.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1213.006 Databases Sub-technique

MgBot includes a module capable of stealing content from the Tencent QQ database storing user QQ message history on infected devices.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023
Enterprise T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers Sub-technique

MgBot includes modules for stealing credentials from various browsers and applications, including Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Foxmail, QQBrowser, FileZilla, and WinSCP.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

MgBot includes modules for collecting files from local systems based on a given set of properties and filenames.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023
Enterprise T1025 Data from Removable Media

MgBot includes modules capable of gathering information from USB thumb drives and CD-ROMs on the victim machine given a list of provided criteria.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023
Enterprise T1482 Domain Trust Discovery

MgBot includes modules for collecting information on local domain users and permissions.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1115 Clipboard Data

MgBot can capture clipboard data.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

MgBot includes modules that can steal cookies from Firefox, Chrome, and Edge web browsers.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023
Enterprise T1018 Remote System Discovery

MgBot includes modules for performing ARP scans of local connected systems.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

MgBot includes a module for establishing a process watchdog for itself, identifying if the MgBot process is still running.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery

MgBot includes modules for performing HTTP and server service scans.CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Enterprise T1123 Audio Capture

MgBot can capture input and output audio streams from infected devices.CitationESET EvasivePanda 2023CitationSymantec Daggerfly 2023
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G1034: Daggerfly

Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1056.001: Keylogging Enterprise uses · Technique T1033: System Owner/User Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1087.002: Domain Account Enterprise uses · Technique T1003: OS Credential Dumping Enterprise uses · Group G1034: Daggerfly Enterprise uses · Technique T1555: Credentials from Password Stores Enterprise uses · Technique T1087.001: Local Account Enterprise uses · Technique T1213.006: Databases Enterprise uses · Technique T1555.003: Credentials from Web Browsers Enterprise uses · Technique T1005: Data from Local System Enterprise uses · Technique T1025: Data from Removable Media Enterprise uses · Technique T1482: Domain Trust Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1115: Clipboard Data Enterprise uses · Technique T1539: Steal Web Session Cookie Enterprise uses · Technique T1018: Remote System Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1046: Network Service Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1123: Audio Capture Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a6edd5b9cff8f3f2...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle a6edd5b9cff8…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Szappanos MgBot 2014

    Gabor Szappanos. (2014, February 3). Needle in a haystack. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ESET EvasivePanda 2023

    Facundo Muñoz. (2023, April 26). Evasive Panda APT group delivers malware via updates for popular Chinese software. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Symantec Daggerfly 2024

    Threat Hunter Team. (2024, July 23). Daggerfly: Espionage Group Makes Major Update to Toolset. Retrieved July 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attack S1146
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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