Live Active security incident? Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1124: System Time Discovery

An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or systemsetup on macOS.[1][2][3] These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.[4][5]

System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.[2] In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as GetTickCount() to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.[6]

On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.[7] On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.

In addition, system calls – such as time() – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.[8] On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as systemsetup -gettimezone or timeIntervalSinceNow to gather current time zone information or current date and time.[9][10]

This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job[11], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.[12]

EnterpriseT1124TechniqueObject v1.5 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

System Time Discovery is usually a small discovery action, but it can matter because timing is often part of an intrusion plan. An attacker may check local or remote time, time zone, or uptime to schedule later activity, infer victim locality, avoid analysis, or align follow-on actions such as scheduled tasks. For leaders, this is not a standalone “high-severity” behavior; it is a context signal that becomes important when paired with other discovery, execution, persistence, or lateral movement activity.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique as part of intrusion correlation and response readiness rather than as a control problem to solve in isolation. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can reconstruct time-based attacker behavior across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, and network devices, and whether logs are time-synchronized enough to support investigations, audit evidence, and incident decisions. The relationship set shows this behavior appears across espionage, ransomware, and RAT/backdoor contexts, so it is useful for detection chaining even though it is common and often benign.

Technical view

Validate platform-aware visibility for commands and APIs referenced by ATT&CK: Windows examples include `net time \\hostname` and `w32tm /tz`; macOS includes `systemsetup -gettimezone`; network devices may show commands such as `show clock detail`; ESXi may show `esxcli system clock get`; Linux activity may involve system calls such as `time()`. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for T1124, use DET0151’s relationship as support for a behavior-chain strategy: treat time discovery as weak on its own but stronger when adjacent to scheduled task/job creation, system/location discovery, sandbox-evasion-like timing checks, remote host enumeration, or malware/backdoor execution relationships.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for Windows, Linux, macOS, and ESXi administrative shells
  • Windows command usage involving Net and Windows Time Service tooling where collected
  • macOS command execution logs for `systemsetup` where available
  • Linux shell history, audit, or EDR telemetry that can show time-related commands or suspicious process context
  • Network device command accounting/CLI logs for clock-detail queries

Detection direction

  • Do not alert on time queries alone without context; administrators, scripts, monitoring tools, and troubleshooting workflows commonly check system time.
  • Tune for unusual parent processes, remote targets, rare users, post-compromise tooling, or time discovery occurring immediately before scheduled task/job activity or other discovery behaviors.
  • Create platform-specific detections for the named command patterns, then suppress known-good administrative automation.
  • For network devices and ESXi, confirm that management-plane and CLI logging are actually ingested; these platforms are common blind spots compared with standard endpoint telemetry.
  • Use the ATT&CK relationships as hunting context: related campaigns, groups, and software indicate the behavior is used by diverse intrusion types, but those relationships do not prove local exposure or current activity.

Mitigation priorities

  • Maintain accurate, centralized time synchronization so investigations and compliance evidence are reliable.
  • Restrict and monitor remote administrative access to systems, ESXi hosts, and network devices where time information can be queried remotely.
  • Apply least-privilege administration and command/accountability logging for device CLIs and operating-system management tools.
  • Focus prevention effort on higher-value adjacent behaviors, such as unauthorized scheduled task/job creation, remote execution, and persistence, rather than trying to block ordinary time reads.
  • Include time-discovery checks in incident-response playbooks as a correlation clue, especially when delayed execution or locality targeting is suspected.
Analyst notes and limits

T1124 is a discovery technique across ESXi, Linux, macOS, network devices, and Windows. Its value is mostly analytic: it can help explain attacker timing, targeting, sandbox evasion, or staging behavior. The supplied relationships include DET0151 and multiple campaigns, groups, and software entries, supporting use in threat-informed detection engineering without implying current exploitation in any specific environment.

MITRE does not provide official detection or mitigation text for this object in the supplied fields. Local baselines are required because legitimate time checks are common. API-level time checks may not be visible in many environments, and network device or ESXi telemetry may be absent unless specifically configured.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

System Time Discovery

An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or systemsetup on macOS.[1][2][3] These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.[4][5]

System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.[2] In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as GetTickCount() to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.[6]

On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.[7] On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.

In addition, system calls – such as time() – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.[8] On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as systemsetup -gettimezone or timeIntervalSinceNow to gather current time zone information or current date and time.[9][10]

This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job[11], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.[12]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0121: Sidewinder

Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G1017: Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].

Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]

Group Enterprise

G0126: Higaisa

Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0128: ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G0060: BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G1012: CURIUM

CURIUM is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.[1] CURIUM has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note CURIUM has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.[2]

Group Enterprise

G0010: Turla

Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]

Group Enterprise

G0012: Darkhotel

Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0114: Chimera

Chimera is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G0046: FIN7

FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

Group Enterprise

G1048: UNC3886

UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]

Malware Enterprise

S0140: Shamoon

Shamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the "Cutting Sword of Justice" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. Analysis has linked Shamoon with Kwampirs based on multiple shared artifacts and coding patterns.[1] The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.[2][3][4][5]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1178: ShrinkLocker

ShrinkLocker is a VBS-based malicious script that leverages the legitimate Bitlocker application to encrypt files on victim systems for ransom. ShrinkLocker functions by using Bitlocker to encrypt files, then renames impacted drives to the adversary’s contact email address to facilitate communication for the ransom payment.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0373: Astaroth

Astaroth is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. [1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0251: Zebrocy

Zebrocy is a Trojan that has been used by APT28 since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang. [1][2][3][4]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0596: ShadowPad

ShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups. [1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0011: Taidoor

Taidoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.[1] Taidoor has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.[2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0098: T9000

T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations. [1] [2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1051: KEYPLUG

KEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.[1]

LinuxWindows
Tool Enterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0012: Operation CuckooBees

Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0014: Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]

Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0015: C0015

C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.5
Created
Modified
Raw hash
bea66afa466568e9...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.5 Current bundle bea66afa4665…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    MSDN System Time

    Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Technet Windows Time Service

    Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    systemsetup mac time

    Apple Support. (n.d.). About systemsetup in Remote Desktop. Retrieved March 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Mac Time Sync

    Cone, Matt. (2021, January 14). Synchronize your Mac's Clock with a Time Server. Retrieved March 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    linux system time

    ArchLinux. (2024, February 1). System Time. Retrieved March 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

    YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - How Attackers Avoid Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 26, 2023.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd

    Cisco. (2023, March 6). show clock detail - Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    MAGNET GOBLIN

    Check Point Research. (2024, March 8). MAGNET GOBLIN TARGETS PUBLICLY FACING SERVERS USING 1-DAY VULNERABILITIES. Retrieved March 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    System Information Discovery Technique

    YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). The System Information Discovery Technique Explained - MITRE ATT&CK T1082. Retrieved March 27, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022

    M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    RSA EU12 They're Inside

    Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    AnyRun TimeBomb

    Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    mitre-attack T1124
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.