T1124: System Time Discovery
An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or systemsetup on macOS.[1][2][3] These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.[4][5]
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.[2] In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as GetTickCount() to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.[6]
On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.[7] On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.
In addition, system calls – such as time() – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.[8] On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as systemsetup -gettimezone or timeIntervalSinceNow to gather current time zone information or current date and time.[9][10]
This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job[11], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.[12]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
System Time Discovery is usually a small discovery action, but it can matter because timing is often part of an intrusion plan. An attacker may check local or remote time, time zone, or uptime to schedule later activity, infer victim locality, avoid analysis, or align follow-on actions such as scheduled tasks. For leaders, this is not a standalone “high-severity” behavior; it is a context signal that becomes important when paired with other discovery, execution, persistence, or lateral movement activity.
Executive priority
Prioritize this technique as part of intrusion correlation and response readiness rather than as a control problem to solve in isolation. Executives should ask whether SOC and IR teams can reconstruct time-based attacker behavior across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, and network devices, and whether logs are time-synchronized enough to support investigations, audit evidence, and incident decisions. The relationship set shows this behavior appears across espionage, ransomware, and RAT/backdoor contexts, so it is useful for detection chaining even though it is common and often benign.
Technical view
Validate platform-aware visibility for commands and APIs referenced by ATT&CK: Windows examples include `net time \\hostname` and `w32tm /tz`; macOS includes `systemsetup -gettimezone`; network devices may show commands such as `show clock detail`; ESXi may show `esxcli system clock get`; Linux activity may involve system calls such as `time()`. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for T1124, use DET0151’s relationship as support for a behavior-chain strategy: treat time discovery as weak on its own but stronger when adjacent to scheduled task/job creation, system/location discovery, sandbox-evasion-like timing checks, remote host enumeration, or malware/backdoor execution relationships.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for Windows, Linux, macOS, and ESXi administrative shells
- Windows command usage involving Net and Windows Time Service tooling where collected
- macOS command execution logs for `systemsetup` where available
- Linux shell history, audit, or EDR telemetry that can show time-related commands or suspicious process context
- Network device command accounting/CLI logs for clock-detail queries
Detection direction
- Do not alert on time queries alone without context; administrators, scripts, monitoring tools, and troubleshooting workflows commonly check system time.
- Tune for unusual parent processes, remote targets, rare users, post-compromise tooling, or time discovery occurring immediately before scheduled task/job activity or other discovery behaviors.
- Create platform-specific detections for the named command patterns, then suppress known-good administrative automation.
- For network devices and ESXi, confirm that management-plane and CLI logging are actually ingested; these platforms are common blind spots compared with standard endpoint telemetry.
- Use the ATT&CK relationships as hunting context: related campaigns, groups, and software indicate the behavior is used by diverse intrusion types, but those relationships do not prove local exposure or current activity.
Mitigation priorities
- Maintain accurate, centralized time synchronization so investigations and compliance evidence are reliable.
- Restrict and monitor remote administrative access to systems, ESXi hosts, and network devices where time information can be queried remotely.
- Apply least-privilege administration and command/accountability logging for device CLIs and operating-system management tools.
- Focus prevention effort on higher-value adjacent behaviors, such as unauthorized scheduled task/job creation, remote execution, and persistence, rather than trying to block ordinary time reads.
- Include time-discovery checks in incident-response playbooks as a correlation clue, especially when delayed execution or locality targeting is suspected.
Analyst notes and limits
T1124 is a discovery technique across ESXi, Linux, macOS, network devices, and Windows. Its value is mostly analytic: it can help explain attacker timing, targeting, sandbox evasion, or staging behavior. The supplied relationships include DET0151 and multiple campaigns, groups, and software entries, supporting use in threat-informed detection engineering without implying current exploitation in any specific environment.
MITRE does not provide official detection or mitigation text for this object in the supplied fields. Local baselines are required because legitimate time checks are common. API-level time checks may not be visible in many environments, and network device or ESXi telemetry may be absent unless specifically configured.
System Time Discovery
An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or systemsetup on macOS.[1][2][3] These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.[4][5]
System time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz.[2] In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as GetTickCount() to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.[6]
On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration.[7] On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.
In addition, system calls – such as time() – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices.[8] On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as systemsetup -gettimezone or timeIntervalSinceNow to gather current time zone information or current date and time.[9][10]
This information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job[11], or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.[12]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0121: Sidewinder
Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.[1][2][3]
G1017: Volt Typhoon
Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].
Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]
G0126: Higaisa
Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]
G0128: ZIRCONIUM
G0060: BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]
G1012: CURIUM
CURIUM is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East.[1] CURIUM has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note CURIUM has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.[2]
G0010: Turla
Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
G0012: Darkhotel
Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.[1][2][3]
G0114: Chimera
G0046: FIN7
FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
G1048: UNC3886
UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]
S0140: Shamoon
Shamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the "Cutting Sword of Justice" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. Analysis has linked Shamoon with Kwampirs based on multiple shared artifacts and coding patterns.[1] The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.[2][3][4][5]
S1178: ShrinkLocker
ShrinkLocker is a VBS-based malicious script that leverages the legitimate Bitlocker application to encrypt files on victim systems for ransom. ShrinkLocker functions by using Bitlocker to encrypt files, then renames impacted drives to the adversary’s contact email address to facilitate communication for the ransom payment.[1][2]
S0373: Astaroth
S0251: Zebrocy
S0596: ShadowPad
S0011: Taidoor
S0396: EvilBunny
S0098: T9000
S1051: KEYPLUG
S0039: Net
The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]
Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.
S0615: SombRAT
S0091: Epic
C0012: Operation CuckooBees
Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.[1]
C0014: Operation Wocao
Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]
Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]
C0015: C0015
C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.5 | Current bundle | bea66afa4665… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
MSDN System Time
Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
Open source URL -
[2]
Technet Windows Time Service
Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
Open source URL -
[3]
systemsetup mac time
Apple Support. (n.d.). About systemsetup in Remote Desktop. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
Open source URL -
[4]
Mac Time Sync
Cone, Matt. (2021, January 14). Synchronize your Mac's Clock with a Time Server. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
Open source URL -
[5]
linux system time
ArchLinux. (2024, February 1). System Time. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
Open source URL -
[6]
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - How Attackers Avoid Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 26, 2023.
Open source URL -
[7]
show_clock_detail_cisco_cmd
Cisco. (2023, March 6). show clock detail - Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.
Open source URL -
[8]
MAGNET GOBLIN
Check Point Research. (2024, March 8). MAGNET GOBLIN TARGETS PUBLICLY FACING SERVERS USING 1-DAY VULNERABILITIES. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
Open source URL -
[9]
System Information Discovery Technique
YUCEEL, Huseyin Can. Picus Labs. (2022, June 9). The System Information Discovery Technique Explained - MITRE ATT&CK T1082. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
Open source URL -
[10]
ESET DazzleSpy Jan 2022
M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022.
Open source URL -
[11]
RSA EU12 They're Inside
Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved November 25, 2016.
Open source URL -
[12]
AnyRun TimeBomb
Malicious History. (2020, September 17). Time Bombs: Malware With Delayed Execution. Retrieved April 22, 2021.
Open source URL -
[13]
mitre-attack T1124Open source URL
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