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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0006: APT1

APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. [1]

EnterpriseG0006GroupObject v1.4 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

APT1 is an ATT&CK group entry for a Chinese threat group attributed in the cited reporting to PLA Unit 61398. The supplied relationships make this most useful as a defensive planning reference for credential theft, Windows administration-tool abuse, remote access malware, discovery, lateral movement, and local data collection. For leaders, the value is not in assuming current exposure to APT1, but in using the group’s mapped behaviors to test whether identity controls, endpoint visibility, and incident response processes can withstand a credential-driven intrusion.

Executive priority

Prioritize this object as a readiness and control-validation case study: can the organization detect and contain credential dumping, pass-the-hash-style authentication abuse, remote execution tooling, RDP use with valid accounts, and backdoor command-and-control patterns? The business risk is operational persistence after initial access: once credentials and remote execution paths are available, containment can become an enterprise-wide identity and endpoint response problem. Executives should ask whether privileged credential protections, Windows endpoint telemetry, lateral movement monitoring, and IR playbooks produce auditable evidence during an intrusion, not just whether named malware signatures exist.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no group-specific detection text and no platforms on the intrusion-set itself. However, the relationship set is strongly Windows-oriented through tools such as Mimikatz, pwdump, gsecdump, Cachedump, Lslsass, PsExec, Net, ipconfig, PoisonIvy, BISCUIT, CALENDAR, GLOOXMAIL, WEBC2, and related credential-access and lateral-movement techniques including LSASS Memory, Remote Desktop Protocol, discovery commands, local data collection, and network connection/configuration discovery. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility across credential material access, LSASS-related activity, suspicious use of built-in admin utilities, remote service execution patterns, RDP logons, unusual process/file naming or placement, and outbound backdoor-like communications that may mimic legitimate web, Gmail Calendar, or Jabber/XMPP-style traffic as described in related software records.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line telemetry for tools and utilities such as Net, Tasklist, ipconfig, PsExec-like execution, and credential dumpers
  • Security event logs and authentication telemetry for privileged logons, RDP sessions, lateral authentication, and possible pass-the-hash-style use of account material
  • Endpoint detection telemetry around LSASS access, memory dumping behavior, registry access for cached credentials, and execution from unusual paths or with misleading names
  • Network telemetry for outbound connections, web traffic, and protocol patterns relevant to backdoors such as WEBC2, CALENDAR, and GLOOXMAIL as described in ATT&CK relationships
  • File, registry, and service telemetry for backdoor persistence indicators, remote execution artifacts, and suspicious service or task enumeration

Detection direction

  • Do not rely only on malware names. Several related items are legitimate or publicly available tools, so detection should focus on behavior: credential dumping, LSASS access, remote execution, discovery bursts, RDP use, and unusual administrative utility chains.
  • Tune for context around legitimate administration. PsExec, Net, Tasklist, ipconfig, and RDP can be normal; higher-fidelity detections usually require baselines for admin hosts, service accounts, expected remote management paths, and change windows.
  • Validate coverage for credential-access techniques first, especially LSASS Memory and tools that obtain password hashes or cached credentials, because the relationship set repeatedly references credential dumping and alternate authentication material.
  • Correlate endpoint and identity evidence. A suspicious credential dump followed by RDP, PsExec-like execution, or remote command execution should be treated differently from isolated utility execution.
  • Review network detections for backdoors that blend into expected traffic patterns, including web-based command retrieval and traffic mimicking legitimate services, while recognizing that ATT&CK does not provide detection logic for this group entry.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with identity hardening: reduce standing administrative privileges, protect privileged accounts, and limit where high-value credentials can log on.
  • Harden credential exposure on Windows endpoints, including controls that reduce access to LSASS and cached credential material where applicable.
  • Restrict and monitor remote administration paths such as RDP and PsExec-like execution; require strong authentication, approved admin workstations, and documented exceptions.
  • Improve endpoint logging and retention before relying on detections; many relevant behaviors require process, command-line, authentication, and memory-access visibility.
  • Segment systems and limit lateral movement paths so stolen credentials or remote execution tools do not provide broad enterprise reach.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on the official ATT&CK APT1 group object, its aliases, cited external references, and listed relationships to software and techniques. The relationship graph is the main source of defensive value because the group object itself has no official detection text, tactics, or platforms. The mapped software includes both malware and legitimate/public tools, so local baselining is essential to separate administration from suspicious use.

ATT&CK fields supplied here do not establish current activity, targeting, victim exposure, or guaranteed detection coverage. The intrusion-set platform and tactics fields are not specified, so platform references are derived only from related software and technique records. Local environment evidence is required to determine relevance, control gaps, and alert fidelity.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

APT1

APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. [1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

23 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sub-technique

APT1 has been known to use credential dumping using Mimikatz.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1057 Process Discovery

APT1 gathered a list of running processes on the system using tasklist /v.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

APT1 has collected files from a local victim.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1550.002 Pass the Hash Sub-technique

The APT1 group is known to have used pass the hash.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1583.001 Domains Sub-technique

APT1 has registered hundreds of domains for use in operations.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1560.001 Archive via Utility Sub-technique

APT1 has used RAR to compress files before moving them outside of the victim network.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

APT1 used a batch script to perform a series of discovery techniques and saves it to a text file.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1114.002 Remote Email Collection Sub-technique

APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. MAPIGET steals email still on Exchange servers that has not yet been archived.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1566.002 Spearphishing Link Sub-technique

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing hyperlinks to malicious files.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

APT1 used the ipconfig /all command to gather network configuration information.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1114.001 Local Email Collection Sub-technique

APT1 uses two utilities, GETMAIL and MAPIGET, to steal email. GETMAIL extracts emails from archived Outlook .pst files.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1588.001 Malware Sub-technique

APT1 used publicly available malware for privilege escalation.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1049 System Network Connections Discovery

APT1 used the net use command to get a listing on network connections.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1585.002 Email Accounts Sub-technique

APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1584.001 Domains Sub-technique

APT1 hijacked FQDNs associated with legitimate websites hosted by hop points.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Sub-technique

The file name AcroRD32.exe, a legitimate process name for Adobe's Acrobat Reader, was used by APT1 as a name for malware.CitationMandiant APT1CitationMandiant APT1 Appendix
Enterprise T1087.001 Local Account Sub-technique

APT1 used the commands net localgroup,net user, and net group to find accounts on the system.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

APT1 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1135 Network Share Discovery

APT1 listed connected network shares.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

APT1 has used the Windows command shell to execute commands, and batch scripting to automate execution.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1588.002 Tool Sub-technique

APT1 has used various open-source tools for privilege escalation purposes.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1007 System Service Discovery

APT1 used the commands net start and tasklist to get a listing of the services on the system.CitationMandiant APT1
Enterprise T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol Sub-technique

The APT1 group is known to have used RDP during operations.CitationFireEye PLA
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Tool Enterprise

S0100: ipconfig

ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration. [1]

Tool Enterprise

S0029: PsExec

PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.[1][2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0121: Lslsass

Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process. [1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0109: WEBC2

WEBC2 is a family of backdoor malware used by APT1 as early as July 2006. WEBC2 backdoors are designed to retrieve a webpage, with commands hidden in HTML comments or special tags, from a predetermined C2 server. [1][2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0008: gsecdump

gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S0345: Seasalt Enterprise uses · Tool S0100: ipconfig Enterprise uses · Malware S0017: BISCUIT Enterprise uses · Tool S0119: Cachedump Enterprise uses · Technique T1003.001: LSASS Memory Enterprise uses · Tool S0029: PsExec Enterprise uses · Malware S0026: GLOOXMAIL Enterprise uses · Technique T1057: Process Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1005: Data from Local System Enterprise uses · Technique T1550.002: Pass the Hash Enterprise uses · Technique T1583.001: Domains Enterprise uses · Technique T1560.001: Archive via Utility Enterprise uses · Tool S0121: Lslsass Enterprise uses · Malware S0012: PoisonIvy Enterprise uses · Malware S0109: WEBC2 Enterprise uses · Technique T1119: Automated Collection Enterprise uses · Technique T1114.002: Remote Email Collection Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.002: Spearphishing Link Enterprise uses · Tool S0002: Mimikatz Enterprise uses · Technique T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery Enterprise uses · Tool S0008: gsecdump Enterprise uses · Technique T1114.001: Local Email Collection Enterprise uses · Tool S0122: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Enterprise uses · Malware S0025: CALENDAR Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
e900813c68d38ff1...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.4 Current bundle e900813c68d3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Mandiant APT1

    Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    APT1

    (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

  3. [3]
    Comment Crew

    (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

  4. [4]
    Comment Group

    (Citation: Mandiant APT1)

  5. [5]
    Comment Panda

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)

  6. [6]
    CrowdStrike Putter Panda

    Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attack G0006
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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