S0475: BackConfig
BackConfig is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by Patchwork.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0475: BackConfig describes [BackConfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0475) is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040).(Citation: Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020)
Executive priority
S0475: BackConfig is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0475: BackConfig by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0475: BackConfig appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BackConfig
BackConfig is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by Patchwork.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | BackConfig has been signed with self signed digital certificates mimicking a legitimate software company.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | BackConfig has used VBS to install its downloader component and malicious documents with VBA macro code.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | BackConfig can download and run batch files to execute commands on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | BackConfig can download and execute additional payloads on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | BackConfig can leverage API functions such as |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | BackConfig has the ability to identify folders and files related to previous infections.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1137.001 | Office Template MacrosSub-technique | BackConfig has the ability to use hidden columns in Excel spreadsheets to store executable files or commands for VBA macros.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | BackConfig has the ability to remove files and folders related to previous infections.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | BackConfig has the ability to gather the victim's computer name.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.010 | Command ObfuscationSub-technique | BackConfig has used compressed and decimal encoded VBS scripts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | BackConfig has the ability to set folders or files to be hidden from the Windows Explorer default view.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | BackConfig has the ability to use scheduled tasks to repeatedly execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | BackConfig has the ability to use HTTPS for C2 communiations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | BackConfig has used a custom routine to decrypt strings.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | BackConfig has hidden malicious payloads in |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique | BackConfig has compromised victims via links to URLs hosting malicious content.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0040: Patchwork
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.[1] [2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 5806e7fb42e7… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 5806e7fb42e7… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 5806e7fb42e7… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Unit 42 BackConfig May 2020
Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS0475Open source URL
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