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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1137: Office Application Startup

Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.

A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.[1] These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.[2]

EnterpriseT1137TechniqueObject v1.4Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceHigh

Office Application Startup persistence matters because it turns normal Microsoft Office or Outlook startup activity into a recurring foothold. In enterprises where Office is widely used, a malicious template macro, add-in-related mechanism, Outlook rule, form, Home Page setting, or Office-related registry hook can survive reboots and re-open every time the user starts the application. For leaders, the issue is not just malware execution; it is whether endpoint, mailbox, and Office configuration controls can prove that common productivity tools are not being used as persistence infrastructure.

Executive priority

Prioritize this technique where Microsoft Office and Outlook are business-critical, especially in Windows environments and organizations using Outlook or Office 365. The business question is whether security teams can inventory and validate Office startup behavior, mailbox rules/forms, legacy Outlook features, and unusual Office-related configuration changes before an incident becomes prolonged. This also supports audit and compliance evidence: show that Office is configured securely, unnecessary legacy features are disabled where possible, software is updated, and endpoint behavior prevention is monitored and tuned.

Technical view

T1137 is an enterprise persistence technique for Windows and Office Suite environments. The supplied sub-technique context points defenders toward Office template macros, the Office Test registry key, Outlook Forms, Outlook Home Page, and Outlook Rules. MITRE does not provide official detection text for the parent technique, but the related detection strategy DET0398 indicates validation should focus on Office startup-based persistence via macros, forms, and registry hooks. SOC and IR teams should confirm visibility across both endpoint state and mailbox/Office configuration state, because some mechanisms may live in local files or registry locations while others may be associated with Outlook or Office 365 mailbox features.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint file and configuration changes involving Office templates and startup-related Office content
  • Windows registry telemetry for Office-related startup or test/debug loading locations, including non-default keys where applicable
  • Office application process start events and child process behavior from Word, Excel, Outlook, or other Office applications
  • Macro execution or Office automation activity where collected
  • Outlook mailbox configuration evidence, including rules, custom forms, and Home Page-related settings

Detection direction

  • Validate whether DET0398-style coverage exists for macros, Outlook forms, and Office-related registry hooks rather than assuming generic malware alerts cover this technique.
  • Baseline legitimate Office template, rule, form, and mailbox customization activity; false positives are likely in environments that use approved macros, custom forms, or automated mail handling.
  • Hunt for Office startup events followed by unexpected code execution behavior, suspicious child processes, or newly introduced persistence artifacts.
  • Correlate endpoint evidence with Outlook/Office 365 or Exchange configuration changes; endpoint-only monitoring may miss mailbox-resident persistence mechanisms.
  • Review legacy Outlook Home Page and custom form usage where present, because uncommon features can become blind spots if not inventoried or logged.

Mitigation priorities

  • Harden Office and Outlook configuration first: restrict or remove unnecessary features, legacy capabilities, and risky customizations where business use does not justify them.
  • Keep Office, Windows, and related software updated to reduce exposure from known security gaps and legacy behavior.
  • Use endpoint behavior-prevention controls to block or alert on suspicious Office process behavior, file changes, registry activity, and API patterns rather than relying only on signatures.
  • Review approved macro, template, add-in, Outlook rule, and custom form governance so exceptions are documented and auditable.
  • During incident response, include mailbox configuration review alongside endpoint persistence checks so Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page settings are not overlooked.
Additional notes and limits

The relationship context shows known ATT&CK group usage by Gamaredon Group and APT32, but that should be used for threat-informed prioritization only, not as evidence of current activity in any environment. The parent object has no official detection text, so practical coverage should be validated through the related DET0398 strategy and local telemetry testing.

This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK object, references, and relationships. It does not prove exploitation in a specific organization, guarantee that a given control detects the behavior, or identify all possible Office startup mechanisms beyond those represented in the supplied sub-techniques and references. Local Office version, Outlook/Office 365 configuration, logging, and business use of macros or custom forms determine actual risk and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Office Application Startup

Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.

A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.[1] These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

6 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1137.002Office TestSub-techniqueOffice Test subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1137.001Office Template MacrosSub-techniqueOffice Template Macros subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1137.004Outlook Home PageSub-techniqueOutlook Home Page subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1137.003Outlook FormsSub-techniqueOutlook Forms subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1137.006Add-insSub-techniqueAdd-ins subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1137.005Outlook RulesSub-techniqueOutlook Rules subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0050: APT32

APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0047: Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon," found in early campaigns.[1][2][3][4][5]

In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers. [6][5]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0f8a5bcdd72c2ce1...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.4Current bundle0f8a5bcdd72c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SensePost Ruler GitHub

    SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    TechNet O365 Outlook Rules

    Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins

    Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    win10_asr

    Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    SensePost Outlook Forms

    Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    SensePost Outlook Home Page

    Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Cybereason Oceanlotus May 2017

    Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017

    Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Palo Alto Office Test Sofacy

    Falcone, R. (2016, July 20). Technical Walkthrough: Office Test Persistence Method Used In Recent Sofacy Attacks. Retrieved July 3, 2017.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    ESET Gamaredon June 2020

    Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    CrowdStrike Outlook Forms

    Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    CrowdStrike Outlook Forms

    Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    CrowdStrike Outlook Forms

    Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms

    Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms

    Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms

    Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Outlook Today Home Page

    Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Outlook Today Home Page

    Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Outlook Today Home Page

    Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    SensePost NotRuler

    SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    SensePost NotRuler

    SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    SensePost NotRuler

    SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    SensePost Ruler GitHub

    SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    SensePost Ruler GitHub

    SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    TechNet O365 Outlook Rules

    Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    TechNet O365 Outlook Rules

    Koeller, B.. (2018, February 21). Defending Against Rules and Forms Injection. Retrieved November 5, 2019.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    mitre-attackT1137
    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    mitre-attackT1137
    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    mitre-attackT1137
    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins

    Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office Persistence. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    win10_asr

    Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    SensePost Outlook Forms

    Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    SensePost Outlook Home Page

    Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019.

    Open source URL
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