S9040: NGate

NGate is an Android malware that was first seen in November 2023 targeting Czech banks and Polish banks. NGate uses Near Field Communication (NFC) to relay a victim’s debit card and banking information from the compromised Android device to the adversary’s device, ultimately resulting in fraudulent ATM withdrawals by the adversary. NGate uses the legitimate tool called NFCGate, developed by students at the Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany.[1][2]

A new variant of NGate that abuses the legitimate application HandyPay, potentially with AI-generated code, has been observed targeting users in Brazil since at least November 2025. This variant is capable of performing NFC transfers like previous iterations with new functionality for capturing and exfiltrating the victim’s payment card PIN.[3]

MobileS9040MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedOct 1, 2026, 18:29 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S9040: NGate describes [NGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9040) is an Android malware that was first seen in November 2023 targeting Czech banks and Polish banks. [NGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9040) uses Near Field Communication (NFC) to relay a victim’s debit card and banking information from the compromised Android device to the adversary’s device, ultimately resulting in fraudulent ATM withdrawals by the adversary. [NGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9040) uses the legitimate tool called NFCGate, developed ...

Executive priority

S9040: NGate is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S9040: NGate by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

Validate whether S9040: NGate appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

NGate

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques11 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Mobile	T1660	Phishing	NGate has been delivered using malicious links from phishing emails and SMS messages as well as malicious websites that mimic Czech banks.[1][2] NGate has also been distributed through a website impersonating a Brazilian lottery (“Rio de Prêmios”) and a fake Google Play web page (“Proteção Cartão”).[3]
Mobile	T1476	Deliver Malicious Application via Other Means	NGate has been distributed via files[.]fm and through fake websites that mimic legitimate services, such as banking websites and Rio de Prêmios, a lottery website.[1][2][3]
Mobile	T1646	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	NGate has exfiltrated the victim’s payment card PIN to the C2 server via HTTP.[3]
Mobile	T1655.001	Match Legitimate Name or LocationSub-technique	NGate has used a WhatsApp profile image that impersonated Caixa Econômica Federal, Brazil’s government-owned bank that manages majority of lotteries.[3]
Mobile	T1437	Application Layer Protocol	NGate has used TCP sockets to communicate with the C2 server.[2]
Mobile	T1421	System Network Connections Discovery	NGate has requested for the `ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE` permission.[2]
Mobile	T1623	Command and Scripting Interpreter	NGate has used Java to execute a variety of actions, such as loading and verifying runtime configuration and disabling the launcher if decryption or parsing failed.[2]
Mobile	T1417.002	GUI Input CaptureSub-technique	NGate has displayed a fake website to collect the user’s banking information.[1]
Mobile	T1406	Obfuscated Files or Information	NGate has decrypted ASCII-hex data from the `assets/___` resource, which resulted in a config file that has the host IP address, port, `sharedToken`, and more.[2]
Mobile	T1437.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	NGate has used TLS to communicate with the C2 server.[2] NGate has also used HTTP to communicate with the C2 server.[3]
Mobile	T1644	Out of Band Data	NGate has used NFC to send the victim's card information through a server to an adversary-controlled device.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 20.0
Object version: 1.0
Created: May 13, 2026, 20:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 1, 2026, 18:29 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 8918c3136523142b...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
20.0	Oct 18, 2026, 20:39 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Oct 1, 2026, 18:29 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`8918c3136523…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
ESETStefankoOsmani_NGate_Aug2024
Stefanko, L., Osmani, J. (2024, August 22). NGate Android malware relays NFC traffic to steal cash. Retrieved November 10, 2025.
Open source URL
[2]
CERTPL_NGate_Nov2025
Ratajczak, K. (2025, November 3). Analysis of NGate malware campaign (NFC relay). Retrieved November 10, 2025.
Open source URL
[3]
ESETStefanko_NGateVariant_Apr2026
Stefanko, L. (2026, April 21). New NGate variant hides in a trojanized NFC payment app. Retrieved May 6, 2026.
Open source URL
[4]
mitre-attackS9040
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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