S9007: HTTPTroy
MITRE ATT&CK S9007: HTTPTroy Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
S9007: HTTPTroy describes [HTTPTroy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9007) is a highly obfuscated backdoor that facilitates collection, command and control, defense evasion and exfiltration. [HTTPTroy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9007) was first reported in October 2025. [HTTPTroy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9007) has been observed in operations attributed to DPRK-affiliated threat actors, including [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094). [HTTPTroy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9007) has been delivered to v...
Executive priority
S9007: HTTPTroy is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9007: HTTPTroy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9007: HTTPTroy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
HTTPTroy
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | This object uses Ingress Tool Transfer. |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | This object uses Windows Command Shell. |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | This object uses Symmetric Cryptography. |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | This object uses Obfuscated Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1132.002 | Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique | This object uses Non-Standard Encoding. |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | This object uses Dynamic API Resolution. |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | This object uses Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | This object uses Screen Capture. |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | This object uses Web Protocols. |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | This object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | This object uses Native API. |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | This object uses File Deletion. |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | This object uses Bypass User Account Control. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0094: Kimsuky
Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]
Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]
DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 74697c73acb3… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 74697c73acb3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Gen Digital Kimsuky HTTPTroy October 2025
Alexndru-Cristian Bardas. (2025, October 30). DPRK’s Playbook: Kimsuky’s HttpTroy and Lazarus’s New BLINDINGCAN Variant. Retrieved April 8, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9007Open source URL
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