LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1193: TAMECAT

TAMECAT is a malware that is used by APT42 to execute PowerShell or C# content.[1]

EnterpriseS1193MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Automated summary not available

Glexia publishes ATT&CK takes only after source-hash and schema validation. Until then, use the official MITRE definition below and the defensive relationship context on this page.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

TAMECAT

TAMECAT is a malware that is used by APT42 to execute PowerShell or C# content.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

9 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

TAMECAT has used `cmd.exe` to run the `curl` command.[1]

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

TAMECAT has used `wget` and `curl` to download additional content.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

TAMECAT has used VBScript to query anti-virus products.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

TAMECAT has encoded C2 traffic with Base64.[1]

EnterpriseT1047Windows Management Instrumentation

TAMECAT has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query anti-virus products.[1]

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

TAMECAT has used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[1]

EnterpriseT1518.001Security Software DiscoverySub-technique

TAMECAT has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check for anti-virus products.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.001PowerShellSub-technique

TAMECAT has used PowerShell to download and run additional content.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

TAMECAT has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1044: APT42

APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance.[1] The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015.[1] APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices.[1] Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools.[2]

APT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1105: Ingress Tool TransferEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1047: Windows Management InstrumentationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1573.001: Symmetric CryptographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1518.001: Security Software DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.001: PowerShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · GroupG1044: APT42Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d0cadb754d7a2cb7...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundled0cadb754d7a…
19.21.0Older bundled0cadb754d7a…
19.11.0Older bundled0cadb754d7a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Mandiant APT42-untangling

    Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved October 9, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackS1193
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use