S1168: SampleCheck5000
SampleCheck5000 is a downloader with multiple variants that was used by OilRig including during the Outer Space campaign to download and execute additional payloads. [1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1168: SampleCheck5000 describes [SampleCheck5000](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1168) is a downloader with multiple variants that was used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) including during the [Outer Space](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0042) campaign to download and execute additional payloads. (Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023)(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023)
Executive priority
S1168: SampleCheck5000 is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1168: SampleCheck5000 by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1168: SampleCheck5000 appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
SampleCheck5000
SampleCheck5000 is a downloader with multiple variants that was used by OilRig including during the Outer Space campaign to download and execute additional payloads. [1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | SampleCheck5000 can create unique victim identifiers by using the compromised system’s volume ID.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | SampleCheck5000 can use the Microsoft Office Exchange Web Services API to access an actor-controlled account and retrieve C2 commands and payloads placed in Draft messages.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | SampleCheck5000 can download additional payloads to compromised hosts.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | SampleCheck5000 can decode and decrypt command line strings and files received through C2.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1560.001 | Archive via UtilitySub-technique | SampleCheck5000 can gzip compress files uploaded to a shared mailbox used for C2 and exfiltration.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | SampleCheck5000 can call cmd.exe to execute C2 command line strings.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | SampleCheck5000 can use the Exchange Web Services API for C2 communication.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | SampleCheck5000 can create unique victim identifiers by using the compromised system’s computer name.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | SampleCheck5000 can log the output from C2 commands in an encrypted and compressed format on disk prior to exfiltration.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1567 | Exfiltration Over Web Service | SampleCheck5000 can use the Microsoft Office Exchange Web Services API to access an actor-controlled account and retrieve files for exfiltration.[1][2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
C0042: Outer Space
Outer Space was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2021 that used the SampleCheck5000 downloader and Solar backdoor to target Israeli organizations.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | f72ea77a6feb… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | f72ea77a6feb… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023
Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, September 21). OilRig’s Outer Space and Juicy Mix: Same ol’ rig, new drill pipes. Retrieved November 21, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023
Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]SC5k
(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023)
- [4]mitre-attackS1168Open source URL
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