S1161: BPFDoor
BPFDoor is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, BPFDoor is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. BPFDoor supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1161: BPFDoor describes [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. [BPFDoor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1161) supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.(Citation: Sand...
Executive priority
S1161: BPFDoor is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1161: BPFDoor by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1161: BPFDoor appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BPFDoor
BPFDoor is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, BPFDoor is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. BPFDoor supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1070 | Indicator Removal | |
| Enterprise | T1480.002 | Mutual ExclusionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | |
| Enterprise | T1036.011 | Overwrite Process ArgumentsSub-technique | BPFDoor overwrites the `argv[0]` value used by the Linux `/proc` filesystem to determine the command line and command name to display for each process. BPFDoor selects a name from 10 hardcoded names that resemble Linux system daemons, such as; `/sbin/udevd -d`, `dbus-daemon --system`, `avahi-daemon: chroot helper`, `/sbin/auditd -n`, and `/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1205.002 | Socket FiltersSub-technique | BPFDoor uses BPF bytecode to attach a filter to a network socket to view ICMP, UDP, or TCP packets coming through ports 22 (ssh), 80 (http), and 443 (https). When BPFDoor finds a packet containing its “magic” bytes, it parses out two fields and forks itself. The parent process continues to monitor filtered traffic while the child process executes the instructions from the parsed fields.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1564.011 | Ignore Process InterruptsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1036.009 | Break Process TreesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1686 | Disable or Modify System Firewall | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1690 | Prevent Command History Logging |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 51e68d0de54b… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 51e68d0de54b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Sandfly BPFDoor 2022
The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023
Shaul Vilkomir-Preisman and Eliran Nissan. (2023, May 10). BPFDoor Malware Evolves – Stealthy Sniffing Backdoor Ups Its Game. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Backdoor.Linux.BPFDOOR
(Citation: Merces BPFDOOR 2023)
- [4]Backdoor.Solaris.BPFDOOR.ZAJE
(Citation: Harries JustForFun 2022)
- [5]Harries JustForFun 2022
Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
Open source URL - [6]JustForFun
(Citation: Harries JustForFun 2022)
- [7]Merces BPFDOOR 2023
Fernando Merces. (2023, July 13). Detecting BPFDoor Backdoor Variants Abusing BPF Filters. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
Open source URL - [8]mitre-attackS1161Open source URL
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