S1151: ZeroCleare
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ZeroCleare
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | ZeroCleare can use the `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX`, `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY`, and `IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO` system calls to compute disk size.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | ZeroCleare has used a vulnerable signed VBoxDrv driver to bypass Microsoft Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protections and subsequently load the unsigned RawDisk driver.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | ZeroCleare can deploy a vulnerable, signed driver on a compromised host to bypass operating system safeguards.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | ZeroCleare can receive command line arguments from an operator to corrupt the file system using the RawDisk driver.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | ZeroCleare can call the `GetSystemDirectoryW` API to locate the system directory.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | ZeroCleare has the ability to uninstall the RawDisk driver and delete the `rwdsk` file on disk.[3][2] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | ZeroCleare can use a malicious PowerShell script to bypass Windows controls.[4] |
| Enterprise | T1561.002 | Disk Structure WipeSub-technique | ZeroCleare can corrupt the file system and wipe the system drive on targeted hosts.[3][2][4] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
C0038: HomeLand Justice
HomeLand Justice was a disruptive cyber campaign conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. The activity combined ransomware, wiper malware, and data leak operations. Initial access for HomeLand Justice was established as early as May 2021, and threat actors moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the destructive phase of the operation. Responsibility was claimed by the "HomeLand Justice" front, which framed the campaign as retaliation against the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group with a presence in Albania. Multiple Iran-nexus groups are assessed to have participated in the campaign, including HEXANE who probed victim infrastructure.[1][2][3] A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics following public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.[3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | d3658fbbfbf3… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d3658fbbfbf3… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d3658fbbfbf3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022
MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022
CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022
Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [4]IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019
Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]ZEROCLEAR
(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)
- [6]mitre-attackS1151Open source URL
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