S1143: LunarLoader
LunarLoader is the loader component for the LunarWeb and LunarMail backdoors that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). LunarLoader has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1143: LunarLoader describes [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) is the loader component for the [LunarWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1141) and [LunarMail](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1142) backdoors that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). [LunarLoader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1143) has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.(Citatio...
Executive priority
S1143: LunarLoader is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1143: LunarLoader by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1143: LunarLoader appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
LunarLoader
LunarLoader is the loader component for the LunarWeb and LunarMail backdoors that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). LunarLoader has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | LunarLoader can verify the targeted host's DNS name which is then used in the creation of a decyrption key.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | LunarLoader can use the DNS domain name of a compromised host to create a decryption key to ensure a malicious payload can only execute against the intended targets.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | LunarLoader can deobfuscate files containing the next stages in the infection chain.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1137.006 | Add-insSub-technique | LunarLoader has the ability to use Microsoft Outlook add-ins to establish persistence. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1620 | Reflective Code Loading | LunarLoader can use reflective loading to decrypt and run malicious executables in a new thread.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0010: Turla
Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.[1][2][3][4][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 06fe96bb6195… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 06fe96bb6195… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024
Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1143Open source URL
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