S1048: macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.[1][2]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1048: macOS.OSAMiner describes [macOS.OSAMiner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1048) is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed [macOS.OSAMiner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1048) may have been circulating since at least 2015. [macOS.OSAMiner](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1048) is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run...
Executive priority
S1048: macOS.OSAMiner is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1048: macOS.OSAMiner by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1048: macOS.OSAMiner appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.[1][2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1685 | Disable or Modify Tools | macOS.OSAMiner has searched for the Activity Monitor process in the System Events process list and kills the process if running. macOS.OSAMiner also searches the operating system's `install.log` for apps matching its hardcoded list, killing all matching process names.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | macOS.OSAMiner has used `curl` to download a Stripped Payloads from a public facing adversary-controlled webpage. |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | macOS.OSAMiner has checked to ensure there is enough disk space using the Unix utility `df`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | macOS.OSAMiner can parse the output of the native `system_profiler` tool to determine if the machine is running with 4 cores.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.008 | Stripped PayloadsSub-technique | macOS.OSAMiner has used run-only Applescripts, a compiled and stripped version of AppleScript, to remove human readable indicators to evade detection.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.009 | Embedded PayloadsSub-technique | macOS.OSAMiner has embedded Stripped Payloads within another run-only Stripped Payloads.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | macOS.OSAMiner can gather the device serial number.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1543.001 | Launch AgentSub-technique | macOS.OSAMiner has placed a Stripped Payloads with a `plist` extension in the Launch Agent's folder. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1569.001 | LaunchctlSub-technique | macOS.OSAMiner has used `launchctl` to restart the Launch Agent.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | macOS.OSAMiner has used `ps ax | grep | grep -v grep | ...` and `ps ax | grep -E...` to conduct process discovery.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.002 | AppleScriptSub-technique | macOS.OSAMiner has used `osascript` to call itself via the `do shell script` command in the Launch Agent `.plist` file.[1] |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | c60c087b64d5… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | c60c087b64d5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021
Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]VMRay OSAMiner dynamic analysis 2021
VMRAY. (2021, January 14). Malware Analysis Spotlight: OSAMiner Uses Run-Only AppleScripts to Evade Detection. Retrieved October 4, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS1048Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.