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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S1037: STARWHALE

STARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1037MalwareObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1037: STARWHALE describes [STARWHALE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037) is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069), possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a [STARWHALE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037) variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of [STARWHALE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1037) by UNC3313, which may be associated with [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069)...

Executive priority

S1037: STARWHALE is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1037: STARWHALE by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1037: STARWHALE appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

STARWHALE

STARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

STARWHALE can gather the computer name of an infected host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

STARWHALE has the ability to create the following Windows service to establish persistence on an infected host: `sc create Windowscarpstss binpath= "cmd.exe /c cscript.exe c:\\windows\\system32\\w7_1.wsf humpback_whale" start= "auto" obj= "LocalSystem"`.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

STARWHALE can exfiltrate collected data to its C2 servers.[2]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

STARWHALE can establish persistence by installing itself in the startup folder, whereas the GO variant has created a `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookM` registry key.[2][1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

STARWHALE has the ability to contact actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User Discovery

STARWHALE can gather the username from an infected host.[1][2]

EnterpriseT1204.002Malicious FileSub-technique

STARWHALE has relied on victims opening a malicious Excel file for execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.005Visual BasicSub-technique

STARWHALE can use the VBScript function `GetRef` as part of its persistence mechanism.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

STARWHALE has the ability to collect the IP address of an infected host.[2]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

STARWHALE has been obfuscated with hex-encoded strings.[2]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

STARWHALE has the ability to execute commands via `cmd.exe`.[1]

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

STARWHALE has the ability to hex-encode collected data from an infected host.[2]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

STARWHALE can collect data from an infected local host.[2]

EnterpriseT1074.001Local Data StagingSub-technique

STARWHALE has stored collected data in a file called `stari.txt`.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0069: MuddyWaterEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1082: System Information DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1543.003: Windows ServiceEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1033: System Owner/User DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1204.002: Malicious FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.005: Visual BasicEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1132.001: Standard EncodingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1074.001: Local Data StagingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
8727708bf2721390...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle8727708bf272…
19.11.1Older bundle8727708bf272…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Mandiant UNC3313 Feb 2022

    Tomcik, R. et al. (2022, February 24). Left On Read: Telegram Malware Spotted in Latest Iranian Cyber Espionage Activity. Retrieved August 18, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022

    FBI, CISA, CNMF, NCSC-UK. (2022, February 24). Iranian Government-Sponsored Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against Global Government and Commercial Networks. Retrieved September 27, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    CANOPY

    (Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS1037
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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