S1031: PingPull

PingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.[1]

EnterpriseS1031MalwareObject v1.0ModifiedApr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)

S1031: PingPull describes [PingPull](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1031) is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) since at least June 2022. [PingPull](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1031) has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.(Citation: Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022)

Executive priority

S1031: PingPull is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1031: PingPull by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1031: PingPull appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PingPull

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques15 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1571	Non-Standard Port	PingPull can use HTTPS over port 8080 for C2.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	PingPull can enumerate storage volumes and folder contents of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1005	Data from Local System	PingPull can collect data from a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	A PingPull variant can communicate with its C2 servers by using HTTPS.[1]
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	PingPull can retrieve the hostname of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.004	Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique	PingPull can mimic the names and descriptions of legitimate services such as `iphlpsvc`, `IP Helper`, and `Onedrive` to evade detection.[1]
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	PingPull can retrieve the IP address of a compromised host.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.001	Standard EncodingSub-technique	PingPull can encode C2 traffic with Base64.[1]
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	PingPull has the ability to install itself as a service.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.006	TimestompSub-technique	PingPull has the ability to timestomp a file.[1]
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	PingPull variants have the ability to communicate with C2 servers using ICMP or TCP.[1]
Enterprise	T1059.003	Windows Command ShellSub-technique	PingPull can use `cmd.exe` to run various commands as a reverse shell.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	PingPull can decrypt received data from its C2 server by using AES.[1]
Enterprise	T1041	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	PingPull has the ability to exfiltrate stolen victim data through its C2 channel.[1]
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	PingPull can use AES, in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode padded with PKCS5, to encrypt C2 server communications.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0093: GALLIUM

GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers.[1] Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.0
Created: Aug 9, 2022, 18:21 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 977b7cc7edbcda3a...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`977b7cc7edbc…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.0	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`977b7cc7edbc…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022
Unit 42. (2022, June 13). GALLIUM Expands Targeting Across Telecommunications, Government and Finance Sectors With New PingPull Tool. Retrieved August 7, 2022.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1031
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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